Results 91 to 100 of about 387 (226)

In Defense of Comparability: Reply to Carlson and Risberg

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT In “The Case for Comparability,” we argue that every comparative expression “F$F$” obeys Comparability: if two things are at least as F$F$ as themselves, then one of them must be at least as F$F$ as the other. One of our arguments appeals to the apparent validity of the Strong Monotonicity schema: x$x$ is F$F$; y$y$ is not F$F$; so, x$x$ is ...
Cian Dorr, Jacob M. Nebel, Jake Zuehl
wiley   +1 more source

The Form of Agency

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Philosophers often think agency is essentially connected with rationality, intention, or control. However, Minimalists argue that agency is just the power to cause a change; acids and boulders are agents too. Many philosophers treat Minimalism as a wild outlier, assuming its falsity without argument.
William Hornett
wiley   +1 more source

Secrecy: An Epistemological Account

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Although the ethical and political implications of secrecy are significant, I argue here that its fundamental nature is epistemological and that any account of its nature must be based on its epistemological profile. In particular, I propose examining secrecy within the framework of social and political epistemology, considering secrets as ...
Jesús Navarro
wiley   +1 more source

Knowledge and Argument

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT I argue that knowledge plays a distinctive role in psychological explanation that weaker epistemic states cannot because it is robust in the face of counterevidence in a way that they are not. Being robust in the face of counterevidence makes your belief robust in the face of counterargument.
Spencer Paulson
wiley   +1 more source

A Scale for Mixed Reasons for Belief

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Epistemic reasons matter for what you should believe. But then, some think there are practical reasons that matter, too. How could both sorts of reasons be weighed together to determine the doxastic states you ought to hold, all things considered?
Matthew Vermaire
wiley   +1 more source

Perceiving Particulars

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Causalists contend that you see a specific object (rather than a lookalike, or no object at all) because that object sits at the beginning of an appropriate causal chain that terminates in your visual experience. We argue that neither standard causalists nor their non‐causalist opponents can adequately accommodate a striking asymmetry between ...
Dominic Alford‐Duguid, Umrao Sethi
wiley   +1 more source

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