Results 201 to 210 of about 25,352 (247)

Ontology After Folk Psychology; or, Why Eliminativists Should Be Mental Fictionalists

open access: yesAnalytic Philosophy, Volume 67, Issue 1, Page 1-11, March 2026.
ABSTRACT Mental fictionalism holds that folk psychology should be regarded as a kind of fiction. The present version gives a Lewisian prefix semantics for mentalistic discourse, where roughly, a mentalistic sentence “p” is true iff “p” is deducible from the folk psychological fiction.
Ted Parent
wiley   +1 more source

Zero discrimination in practice: resisting anti‐trans backlash in the global HIV response

open access: yes
Journal of the International AIDS Society, Volume 29, Issue 3, March 2026.
Tonia C. Poteat   +3 more
wiley   +1 more source

A Modest Conception of Moral Right & Wrong

open access: yesAnalytic Philosophy, Volume 67, Issue 1, Page 72-82, March 2026.
ABSTRACT Taking inspiration from Hume, I advance a conception of the part of morality concerned with right and wrong, rooted in the actual moral rules established and followed within our society. Elsewhere, I have argued this approach provides a way of thinking about how we are genuinely “bound in a moral way” to keep our moral obligations that it is ...
Jorah Dannenberg
wiley   +1 more source

What Second‐Best Epistemology Could Be

open access: yesAnalytic Philosophy, Volume 67, Issue 1, Page 46-58, March 2026.
ABSTRACT According to the Theory of the Second Best, in non‐ideal circumstances, approximating ideals might be suboptimal (with respect to a specific interpretation of what “approximating an ideal” means). In this paper, I argue that the formal model underlying the Theory can apply to problems in epistemology.
Marc‐Kevin Daoust
wiley   +1 more source

How to Think About Tacit (or Implicit) Beliefs

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 112, Issue 2, Page 335-345, March 2026.
ABSTRACT This paper defends a novel theory of tacit belief (sometimes called “implicit belief”). After providing some background and taxonomy, I argue that dispositionalist theories of belief fail to provide a good account of tacit beliefs; this failure gives us a reason to reject those dispositionalist theories.
Andrew Moon
wiley   +1 more source

Home - About - Disclaimer - Privacy