Results 121 to 130 of about 183 (169)
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1993
Abstract As I use the term, externalism is the complement of internalism; the externalist denies that in order for one of my beliefs to have warrant for me, I must have some sort of special or privileged access to the fact that I have warrant, or to its ground.
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Abstract As I use the term, externalism is the complement of internalism; the externalist denies that in order for one of my beliefs to have warrant for me, I must have some sort of special or privileged access to the fact that I have warrant, or to its ground.
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2003
When I was a graduate student I would have gone to great lengths to talk with Keith Lehrer about epistemology. In fact, I did! Hearing that Lehrer would be talking at my alma mater, Georgetown University, I drove down to Washington D.C. from Providence, listened to his talk, and got myself invited to dinner. Much to the Georgetown students’ horror, and
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When I was a graduate student I would have gone to great lengths to talk with Keith Lehrer about epistemology. In fact, I did! Hearing that Lehrer would be talking at my alma mater, Georgetown University, I drove down to Washington D.C. from Providence, listened to his talk, and got myself invited to dinner. Much to the Georgetown students’ horror, and
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Synthese, 1993
Contre le scepticisme de Hume concernant la legitimite de la connaissance inductive, l'A. propose une solution fiabiliste au probleme de la justification de l'induction, qui autorise la these de la ...
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Contre le scepticisme de Hume concernant la legitimite de la connaissance inductive, l'A. propose une solution fiabiliste au probleme de la justification de l'induction, qui autorise la these de la ...
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1996
How can we ever find out whether our psychological processes are reliable? According to many reliabilists-e.g. Alston (1989a), Goldman (1986, pp. 118, 393-94), Papineau (1992; 1993, pp. 154-70), and Van Cleve' (1984)there is no problem: We just use our psychological processes and then arrive at the belief that these very same processes are reliable. If
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How can we ever find out whether our psychological processes are reliable? According to many reliabilists-e.g. Alston (1989a), Goldman (1986, pp. 118, 393-94), Papineau (1992; 1993, pp. 154-70), and Van Cleve' (1984)there is no problem: We just use our psychological processes and then arrive at the belief that these very same processes are reliable. If
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Philosophical Studies, 2006
Objections to reliabilist theories of knowledge and justification have looked insuperable. Reliability is a property of the process of belief formation. But the generality problem apparently makes the specification of any such process ambiguous. The externalism of reliability theories clashes with strongly internalist intuitions.
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Objections to reliabilist theories of knowledge and justification have looked insuperable. Reliability is a property of the process of belief formation. But the generality problem apparently makes the specification of any such process ambiguous. The externalism of reliability theories clashes with strongly internalist intuitions.
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2000
Abstract Gettier’s seminal article on justified true belief (Gettier (1963)) forced a re thinking of the conditions of knowledge. So-called external factors and analyses came to the fore. The distinction between knowledge and mere true opinion turns on the way in which the belief was formed and how it is sustained.
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Abstract Gettier’s seminal article on justified true belief (Gettier (1963)) forced a re thinking of the conditions of knowledge. So-called external factors and analyses came to the fore. The distinction between knowledge and mere true opinion turns on the way in which the belief was formed and how it is sustained.
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Philosophical Studies, 2008
The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and
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The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and
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Process Reliabilism and Cartesian Scepticism
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1996I will be concerned here with a theory of doxastic justification that was first proposed by Alvin Goldman in 1979.1 This theory, which is generally known as process reliabilism, has in recent years gone through a number of changes, and each change has added significantly to its complexity and subtlety.
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2006
In this article I examine several issues concerning reliabilism and deflationism. I critique Alvin Goldman's account of the key differences between correspondence and deflationary theories and his claim that reliabilism can be combined only with those truth theories that maintain a commitment to truthmakers.
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In this article I examine several issues concerning reliabilism and deflationism. I critique Alvin Goldman's account of the key differences between correspondence and deflationary theories and his claim that reliabilism can be combined only with those truth theories that maintain a commitment to truthmakers.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2004
In ‘Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology’Goldman offers a theory of justification inspired by the exemplar account of concept representation. I discuss the connection and conclude that the analogy does not support the theory offered. I then argue that Goldman's rule consequentialist framework for analysis is vulnerable to a problem of ...
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In ‘Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology’Goldman offers a theory of justification inspired by the exemplar account of concept representation. I discuss the connection and conclude that the analogy does not support the theory offered. I then argue that Goldman's rule consequentialist framework for analysis is vulnerable to a problem of ...
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