Results 31 to 40 of about 183 (169)

Reason, Emotion, and the Context Distinction

Philosophia Scientiæ, 2015
Recent empirical and philosophical research challenges the view that reason and emotion necessarily conflict with one another. Philosophers of science have, however, been slow in responding to this research.
Jeff Kochan
doaj   +1 more source

How to Change Minds Ethically: Doxastic Vulnerability, Epistemic Harm Reduction, and the Role of Therapists in Psychedelic Therapy

Journal of Applied Philosophy, Volume 43, Issue 1, Page 178-198, February 2026.
ABSTRACT Psychedelics offer an intriguing novel method for changing minds, supposedly by destabilizing the neurobiology of the belief system. The resulting power to change minds raises ethical and epistemic concerns. This article examines the epistemic status of psychedelic experiences and suggests a skeptical attitude towards beliefs formed under ...
Jan Christoph Bublitz
wiley   +1 more source

Teaching Students to Understand Knowledge: Stress‐Testing the ‘Justified True Belief Account’ for Critical Thinking

Future in Educational Research, Volume 3, Issue 4, Page 569-579, December 2025.
ABSTRACT This conceptual essay, grounded in a close reading of Plato's Theaetetus, argues that before educators can effectively operationalise critical thinking as the rigorous evaluation ('stress‐testing') of competing knowledge claims, university students must first understand foundational epistemological principles rooted in Plato's tripartite ...
Gerry Dunne
wiley   +1 more source

Categorial versus naturalized epistemology

Analytic Philosophy, Volume 66, Issue 4, Page 658-673, December 2025.
Abstract How do we know what kinds of things constitute knowledge or justified belief? Naturalized epistemology is committed to denying a priori insight into the kinds of kinds that are and are not knowledge or justification makers. By contrast, it is argued here that knowledge of these matters is a priori knowledge of a special kind.
Nick Zangwill
wiley   +1 more source

Perfect‐Recall and Bootstrapping Reasoning

Theoria, Volume 91, Issue 6, December 2025.
ABSTRACT Bootstrapping is a suspicious form of reasoning that seems to allow agents to gain knowledge about the reliability of their sources of information ‘from thin air’, without gathering independent evidence about those sources. The bootstrapping problem is the problem of explaining what is wrong with bootstrapping reasoning.
Michael Cohen
wiley   +1 more source

«Cogito Ergo Sum» and Philofsophy of Action

Sententiae, 2015
Analytical philosophy opens new perspectives of studies in the history of philosophy. There are (1) generalized history of analytical interpretations of Cartesian principle cogito ergo sum and (2) analysis of Cartesianism through the prism of ...
Anna Laktionova
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Appreciating the Evidence

Philosophical Issues, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 115-125, October 2025.
ABSTRACT Having evidence does not in itself make a doxastic attitude justified even if the evidence supports the attitude in question. Plausibly, one must also appreciate the support one's evidence provides for the doxastic attitude. Although such appreciation seems central to the picture of justification offered by Evidentialism, its nature has been ...
Kevin McCain
wiley   +1 more source

The Degree of Reliability of Epistemic Processes in Mulla sadra’s Philosophy and virtue Process Epistemology [PDF]

حکمت صدرایی, 2017
Based on perceptual faculties which are effective in knowledge acquisition, Mulla Sadra divides the process of knowledge acquisition to three processes of sense, imagination, and intellect.
akram askarzadeh mazraeh
doaj  

Learning from presupposition

Mind &Language, Volume 40, Issue 4, Page 402-417, September 2025.
P. F. Strawson famously distinguishes what a speaker presupposes from what she asserts in uttering a sentence like “The present King of France is bald”. This paper defends a claim about presupposition's epistemic significance, namely that presupposition can provide a distinctive testimony‐based way for an audience to learn about the world.
Dominic Alford‐Duguid
wiley   +1 more source

Once more, without feeling

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 111, Issue 1, Page 343-365, July 2025.
Abstract I argue for a pluralist theory of moral standing, on which both welfare subjectivity and autonomy can confer moral status. I argue that autonomy does not entail welfare subjectivity, but can ground moral standing in its absence. Although I highlight the existence of plausible views on which autonomy entails phenomenal consciousness, I ...
Andreas L. Mogensen
wiley   +1 more source