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Public Choice, 2018
Some 30 years ago Gordon Tullock, in his capacity as Editor of Public Choice, made a pointed effort to motivate researchers to measure and quantify resource investments in rent-seeking activities. Despite Tullock’s identification of this aspect of rent-seeking as a significant gap in the literature and call to arms, this remains an under-studied topic ...
David N. Laband, John P. Sophocleus
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Some 30 years ago Gordon Tullock, in his capacity as Editor of Public Choice, made a pointed effort to motivate researchers to measure and quantify resource investments in rent-seeking activities. Despite Tullock’s identification of this aspect of rent-seeking as a significant gap in the literature and call to arms, this remains an under-studied topic ...
David N. Laband, John P. Sophocleus
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Committees and Rent-Seeking Effort
Journal of Public Economics, 1984Committees are widely used by nearly all social organizations as a means of developing and implementing policies that often have clear distributive implications. Applications range from academic committees responsible for conferring minor student awards to corporate, congressional, and party committees responsible for decisions that have substantial ...
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Bargaining and rent seeking [PDF]
, 2012 We study a Baron-Ferejohn (1989) type of bargaining model to which we append an investment stage. As long as no agreement is reached, a new proposer is selected randomly from the player set. A proposal is accepted if at least q players accept it. Prior to the bargaining stage, players may make investments to increase their recognition probabili- ties ...
Haruo Imai +1 more
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Journal of Public Economics, 1989
Abstract A dynamic model of the political process is presented under conditions of uncertainty. As in an earlier model by Becker, several interest groups vie for political influence, exerted in the form of taxes and subsidies. Some results of the static, single-interest-group theory of rent seeking are given slightly modified interpretations.
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Abstract A dynamic model of the political process is presented under conditions of uncertainty. As in an earlier model by Becker, several interest groups vie for political influence, exerted in the form of taxes and subsidies. Some results of the static, single-interest-group theory of rent seeking are given slightly modified interpretations.
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Public Choice, 1993
In this paper I present a formal analysis of rent-seeking games in which the players do not move simultaneously. I consider rent-seeking situations where the players are risk neutral and may value the prize differently. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in this Stackelberg game provides several surprising and interesting results.
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In this paper I present a formal analysis of rent-seeking games in which the players do not move simultaneously. I consider rent-seeking situations where the players are risk neutral and may value the prize differently. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in this Stackelberg game provides several surprising and interesting results.
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Public Choice, 1994
This paper presents an analysis of cooperation in the context of a repeated rent-seeking game which can be thought of as modeling bilateral situations such as military/political conflict, labor/business lobbying, gang/illegal activities, or criminal/civil law suits.
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This paper presents an analysis of cooperation in the context of a repeated rent-seeking game which can be thought of as modeling bilateral situations such as military/political conflict, labor/business lobbying, gang/illegal activities, or criminal/civil law suits.
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2008
Models of rent seeking consider players who engage in a contest, with each expending costly effort to increase his chances of winning a given prize. The effort can take many forms, such as campaign contributions, bribery, and advertising. The prize can also take many forms: passage of a favored policy, the grant of a profitable defense contract, or the
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Models of rent seeking consider players who engage in a contest, with each expending costly effort to increase his chances of winning a given prize. The effort can take many forms, such as campaign contributions, bribery, and advertising. The prize can also take many forms: passage of a favored policy, the grant of a profitable defense contract, or the
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The quest for benefit from existing wealth or by seeking privileged benefit through influence over policy is known as rent seeking. Much rent seeking activity involves government and political decisions and is therefore in the domain of political economy, although it can also take place in personal relations and within firms and bureaucracies.
William F. Shughart, Diana W. Thomas
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William F. Shughart, Diana W. Thomas
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