Results 151 to 160 of about 679,623 (334)
Discounted and Finitely Repeated Minority Games with Public Signals. [PDF]
We consider a repeated game where at each stage players simultaneously choose one of two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room are rewarded with one euro. The players in the same room do not recognize each other, and between the stages only
Renault, Jérôme +2 more
core
Behavioral Mistakes Support Cooperation in an N-Person Repeated Public\n Goods Game [PDF]
Jung-Kyoo Choi, Jun Sok Huhh
openalex +1 more source
Shapeshifting Liquid Metal Droplets for Soft Fluidic Machines
This study presented a liquid metal shape shifting strategy which harnesses Lorentz force, surface tension and fluid instabilities to achieve autonomous fluidic power. By using a liquid metal droplet as a mobile current carrier, this strategy enables the development of low‐voltage, self‐oscillating pumps that outperform existing soft pumps.
Saba Firouznia +5 more
wiley +1 more source
Beliefs in Repeated Games [PDF]
Consider a two-player discounted infinitely repeated game. A player's belief is a probability distribution over the opponent's repeated game strategies.
John H. Nachbar
core
Public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game
Loukas Balafoutas
openalex +2 more sources
Information in Repeated Ultimatum Game with Unknown Pie Size [PDF]
Ching Chyi Lee, William K. Lau
openalex +1 more source
Bacteria‐Responsive Nanostructured Drug Delivery Systems for Targeted Antimicrobial Therapy
Bacteria‐responsive nanocarriers are designed to release antimicrobials only in the presence of infection‐specific cues. This selective activation ensures drug release precisely at the site of infection, avoiding premature or indiscriminate release, and enhancing efficacy.
Guillermo Landa +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Stated versus inferred beliefs: A methodological inquiry and experimental test [PDF]
If asking subjects their beliefs during repeated game play changes the way those subjects play, using those stated beliefs to evaluate and compare theories of strategic behavior is problematic.
Rutstrom, E. Elizabet, Wilcox, Nathaniel
core +1 more source

