Results 171 to 180 of about 679,623 (334)
In this paper we provide a framework to reason about limited awareness of the action space in finitely repeated games. Our framework is rich enough to capture the full strategic aspect of limited awareness in a dynamic setting, taking into account the possibility that agents might want to reveal or conceal actions to their opponent or that they might ...
Mengel Friederike +2 more
openaire +2 more sources
This review outlines how understanding bone's biology, hierarchical architecture, and mechanical anisotropy informs the design of lattice structures that replicate bone morphology and mechanical behavior. Additive manufacturing enables the fabrication of orthopedic implants that incorporate such structures using a range of engineering materials ...
Stylianos Kechagias +4 more
wiley +1 more source
A folk theorem for minority games. [PDF]
We study a particular case of repeated games with public signals. In the stage game an odd number of players have to choose simultaneously one of two rooms.
Jerome Renault +2 more
core
Multi‐million cycle reliability for liquid metal stretchable electronics is achieved through a continuous cycle of mechanical testing, failure mode and mechanism analysis and implementing subsequent mitigation strategies. ABSTRACT Stretchable electronics that combine mechanical compliance with reliable electrical performance are essential for ...
Lennert Purnal +8 more
wiley +1 more source
Humans versus Computer Algorithms in a Repeated Constant-Sum Game
Leonidas Spiliopoulos
openalex +1 more source
Advances in Safe, Flexible, and Stretchable Batteries for Wearable Applications
Unlike previous reviews centered on component‐based deformability, this work highlights safety‐driven design strategies for flexible and stretchable batteries. By integrating material‐level engineering, geometry‐controlled structures, biocompatibility, and self‐protection mechanisms, it establishes a unified framework that connects mechanical ...
Hyewon Kang +4 more
wiley +1 more source
An anti-folk theorem for finite past equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring [PDF]
We prove an anti-folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring. We assume that the strategies have a finite past (they are measurable with respect to finite partitions of past histories), that each period players' preferences over actions are ...
Peski, Marcin
core +1 more source
Loss aversion in repeated games [PDF]
The Nash equilibrium solution concept for strategic form games is based on the assumption of expected utility maximization. Reference dependent utility functions (in which utility is determined not only by an outcome, but also by the relationship of the outcome to a reference point) are a better predictor of behavior than expected utility.
openaire +2 more sources

