Results 291 to 300 of about 679,623 (334)
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2015
Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Université Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists.
Jean-François Mertens +2 more
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Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Université Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists.
Jean-François Mertens +2 more
+4 more sources
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021
This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study beliefs and their relationship to action and strategy choices in finitely and indefinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games. We find subjects' beliefs about the other player's action are accurate despite some systematic deviations corresponding to early pessimism in the indefinitely repeated game and ...
Aoyagi, Masaki +2 more
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This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study beliefs and their relationship to action and strategy choices in finitely and indefinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games. We find subjects' beliefs about the other player's action are accurate despite some systematic deviations corresponding to early pessimism in the indefinitely repeated game and ...
Aoyagi, Masaki +2 more
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Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games [PDF]
Econometrica, 1993 Summary: Perfect equilibria of finitely repeated games may be vulnerable to the possibility of renegotiation among players. We study the limiting properties of the set of payoffs from equilibria that are immune to renegotiation. Our main result is that the limit of the set of payoffs from renegotiation proof equilibria is either a singleton or a ...
Benoit, Jean-Pierre, Krishna, Vijay
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Econometrica, 2003
Consider a two-player discounted infinitely repeated game. A player's belief is a probability distribution over the opponent's repeated game strategies. This paper shows that, for a large class of repeated games, there are no beliefs that satisfy three conditions, learnability, consistency, and a diversity condition, CS.
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Consider a two-player discounted infinitely repeated game. A player's belief is a probability distribution over the opponent's repeated game strategies. This paper shows that, for a large class of repeated games, there are no beliefs that satisfy three conditions, learnability, consistency, and a diversity condition, CS.
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SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 1988
Finite extensive form games in which each player's information set may contain nodes lying on a single directed path are considered. The existence of a Nash equilibrium point in randomized strategies is shown. Some examples are considered.
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Finite extensive form games in which each player's information set may contain nodes lying on a single directed path are considered. The existence of a Nash equilibrium point in randomized strategies is shown. Some examples are considered.
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2015
In this chapter repeated and dynamic games will be discussed in which the players know the strategy sets and payoff functions of all players, that is, the game has complete information. It is also assumed that at each time period each player knows the complete history of the game which consists of the past strategy selections and corresponding payoff ...
Akio Matsumoto, Ferenc Szidarovszky
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In this chapter repeated and dynamic games will be discussed in which the players know the strategy sets and payoff functions of all players, that is, the game has complete information. It is also assumed that at each time period each player knows the complete history of the game which consists of the past strategy selections and corresponding payoff ...
Akio Matsumoto, Ferenc Szidarovszky
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2005
Abstract Repeated games are considered. The discussion explains issues surrounding randomization, observability, feasibility, and convexity. Games with pay-off averaging and discounting are examined, along with finitely repeated games. The ‘no-gain-from-one-shot-deviation’ property of games with continuous pay-offs is discussed and the ...
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Abstract Repeated games are considered. The discussion explains issues surrounding randomization, observability, feasibility, and convexity. Games with pay-off averaging and discounting are examined, along with finitely repeated games. The ‘no-gain-from-one-shot-deviation’ property of games with continuous pay-offs is discussed and the ...
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The WHO fungal priority pathogens list as a game-changer
Nature Reviews Microbiology, 2023Matthew C Fisher, David W Denning
exaly