Results 31 to 40 of about 1,689 (257)
Replicator Equations, Maximal Cliques, and Graph Isomorphism [PDF]
We present a new energy-minimization framework for the graph isomorphism problem that is based on an equivalent maximum clique formulation. The approach is centered around a fundamental result proved by Motzkin and Straus in the mid-1960s, and recently expanded in various ways, which allows us to formulate the maximum clique problem in terms of a ...
openaire +4 more sources
We study the initial-value problem for the replicator equation of the N-region Core-Periphery model in spatial economics. The main result shows that if workers are sufficiently agglomerated in a region at the initial time, then the initial-value problem ...
Minoru Tabata, Nobuoki Eshima
doaj +1 more source
Some examples for stable and historic behavior in replicator equations
The evolutionary dynamics of zero-sum and non zero-sum games under replicator equations could be drastically different from each other. In zero-sum games, heteroclinic cycles naturally occur whenever the species of the population supersede each other in ...
Mansoor Saburov
doaj +1 more source
The substrate network path selection problem of virtual network was modeled as an evolutionary game.In the process of evolutionary game,virtual networks adjusted the strategies through the iterated game.The replicator dynamics were leveraged equation to ...
Yu YANG, Shan-zhi CHEN, Xin LI
doaj +2 more sources
On Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable States That Are Not Characterised by the Folk Theorem. [PDF]
In evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable states are characterised by the folk theorem because exact solutions to the replicator equation are difficult to obtain. It is generally assumed that the folk theorem, which is the fundamental theory for
Jiawei Li, Graham Kendall
doaj +1 more source
Improving replicator dynamic evolutionary game model for selecting optimal defense strategies
In terms of the existence of strategy dependency in the same game group,network attack-defense evolutionary game model based on the improved replicator dynamics was constricted by introducing the intensity coefficient,which completed the method of ...
Jianming HUANG, Hengwei ZHANG
doaj +2 more sources
The evolution of cooperation in the unidirectional linear division of labour of finite roles
Evolution of cooperation is a puzzle in evolutionary biology and social sciences. Previous studies assumed that players are equal and have symmetric relationships.
Md Sams Afif Nirjhor, Mayuko Nakamaru
doaj +1 more source
Sequence determinants of RNA G‐quadruplex unfolding by Arg‐rich regions
We show that Arg‐rich peptides selectively unfold RNA G‐quadruplexes, but not RNA stem‐loops or DNA/RNA duplexes. This length‐dependent activity is inhibited by acidic residues and is conserved among SR and SR‐related proteins (SRSF1, SRSF3, SRSF9, U1‐70K, and U2AF1).
Naiduwadura Ivon Upekala De Silva +10 more
wiley +1 more source
Shapley Polygons in 4 x 4 Games
We study 4 x 4 games for which the best response dynamics contain a cycle. We give examples in which multiple Shapley polygons occur for these kinds of games.
Martin Hahn
doaj +1 more source
We reconstituted Synechocystis glycogen synthesis in vitro from purified enzymes and showed that two GlgA isoenzymes produce glycogen with different architectures: GlgA1 yields denser, highly branched glycogen, whereas GlgA2 synthesizes longer, less‐branched chains.
Kenric Lee +3 more
wiley +1 more source

