Results 11 to 20 of about 8,175 (311)
On The Content and Character of Pain Experience [PDF]
, 2019 Tracking representationalism explains the negative affective character of pain, and its capacity to motivate action, by reference to the representation of the badness for us of bodily damage.
Gray, Richard
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Borderline Experiences One Cannot Undergo
Crítica, 2018 Representationalism maintains that the phenomenal character of an experience is fully determined by its intentional content. Representationalism is a very attractive theory in the project of naturalizing consciousness, on the assumption that the ...
Miguel Ángel Sebastián
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Is there introspective evidence for phenomenal intentionality? [PDF]
, 2016 The so-called transparency of experience (TE) is the intuition that, in introspecting one’s own experience, one is only aware of certain properties (like colors, shapes, etc.) as features of (apparently) mind-independent objects.
Bordini, Davide
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General and specific consciousness: a first-order representationalist approach
Frontiers in Psychology, 2013 It is widely acknowledged that a complete theory of consciousness should explain general consciousness (what makes a state conscious at all) and specific consciousness (what gives a conscious state its particular phenomenal quality).
Neil eMehta +2 more
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Descartes’ idea and the representations of things [PDF]
Filozofija i Društvo, 2011 On the basis of the analysis of relevant passages from Descartes’ writings, the article shows that Descartes’ ideas represent things in mind, but that he is not a representationalist in a Malebranchean sense: in Descartes, represented object is ...
Milidrag Predrag
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Representationalism and Ambiguous Figures
Phenomenology and Mind, 2016 The phenomenon of ambiguous figures raises difficulties for the theories of the content of our visual experience that hold that its phenomenal character is identical to its representational content and wholly nonconceptual.
Arianna Uggé
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Two open questions in the reformist agenda of the philosophy of cognitive science
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 2023 In this paper we carve out a reformist agenda within the debate on the foundations of cognitive science, incorporating some important ideas from the 4E cognition literature into the computational-representational framework.
Aurora Alegiani +2 more
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Reductive Representationalism and Emotional Phenomenology [PDF]
, 2017 A prominent view of phenomenal consciousness combines two claims: (i) the identity conditions of phenomenally conscious states can be fully accounted for in terms of these states’ representational content; (ii) this representational content can be fully ...
Barwise +31 more
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How Reliably Misrepresenting Olfactory Experiences Justify True Beliefs [PDF]
, 2020 This chapter argues that olfactory experiences represent either everyday objects or ad hoc olfactory objects as having primitive olfactory properties, which happen to be uninstantiated.
Mendelovici, Angela
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Enacting anti-representationalism. The scope and the limits of enactive critiques of representationalism [PDF]
Avant, 2014 I propose a systematic survey of the various attitudes proponents of enaction (or enactivism) entertained or are entertaining towards representationalism and towards the use of the concept “mental representation” in cognitive science.
Pierre Steiner
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