Results 251 to 260 of about 1,601 (294)
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Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 1998
Abstract. The dominant assumptions throughout contemporary philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence about the ontology underlying intentionality, and its core of representationality, are those of encodings-some sort of informational or correspondence or covariation relationship between the represented and its ...
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Abstract. The dominant assumptions throughout contemporary philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence about the ontology underlying intentionality, and its core of representationality, are those of encodings-some sort of informational or correspondence or covariation relationship between the represented and its ...
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Coreference and Representationalism
2000The compositional interpretation of structures in discourse has raised the question whether some level of representation is indispensable in the analysis of the semantics of natural language. In this paper we formulate and motivate three notions of representationalism (a strong, a medium or midweak, and a weak one) and discuss to what extent existing ...
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Attenuated Representationalism
Analysis, 2022AbstractIn The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, David Papineau offers some metaphysical reasons for rejecting representationalism. This paper overviews these reasons, arguing that while some of his arguments against some versions of representationalism succeed, there are versions of phenomenal intentionalism that escape his criticisms. Still, once we
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Representationalism is a dead end
Synthese, 2018Representationalism—the view that scientific modeling is best understood in representational terms—is the received view in contemporary philosophy of science. Contributions to this literature have focused on a number of puzzles concerning the nature of representation and the epistemic role of misrepresentation, without considering whether these puzzles
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Representationalism and Panpsychism
2021Abstract A solution is offered to the paradox presented in Chapter 1. This solution requires us to embrace a qualified form of panpsychism for consciousness, or rather for a key element of consciousness I call “consciousness*”. Consciousness, I claim, is inherently representational and did indeed evolve.
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Transparency and Representationalism
2021Abstract This chapter explores the phenomenon of transparency and presents several different versions of representationalism about conscious states, only one of which is endorsed. There are discussions of representationalism with respect to perceptual experiences, bodily sensations, emotions, conscious thoughts, and moods. Along the way,
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Representationalism and Blindsight
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2016According to representationalism, phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. According to first-person reports, blindsighters have no phenomenal character in the scotoma, even though their abilities suggest that they have conscious visual representations in the scotoma.
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Representationism, Realism And The Redundancy Of ‘Mentalese’
Theory & Psychology, 1991Representationism as a theory of knowledge cannot avoid collapsing into solipsism, cannot distinguish between true and false beliefs without contradicting its own basic premise and cannot give any objective ground for inference. Fodor's postulated `mentalese' is shown to suffer these defects; further, its nativism cannot bridge the supposed gap between
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2021
Abstract In this chapter some initial arguments for representationalism are considered and dismissed. Naturalist representationalism is distinguished from phenomenal intentionalism and shown to be implausible. Appeals to the ‘transparency’ of experience are considered and shown to be problematic.
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Abstract In this chapter some initial arguments for representationalism are considered and dismissed. Naturalist representationalism is distinguished from phenomenal intentionalism and shown to be implausible. Appeals to the ‘transparency’ of experience are considered and shown to be problematic.
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Representationalism and Antirepresentationalism
1998The notions of representationalism and antirepresentationalism are introduced and used in contemporary philosophical discussions by Richard Rorty to describe his and the neopragmatists' attitude toward traditional problems of epistemology. Rorty means that the history of philosophy shows that there are no final answers to the traditional questions ...
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