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Quantum Bayesian implementation and revelation principle [PDF]

SSRN Electronic Journal, 1952
Bayesian implementation concerns decision making problems when agents have incomplete information. This paper proposes that the traditional sufficient conditions for Bayesian implementation shall be amended by virtue of a quantum Bayesian mechanism.
Wu, Haoyang
core   +6 more sources

Complexity of Strong Implementability [PDF]

Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, 2009
We consider the question of implementability of a social choice function in a classical setting where the preferences of finitely many selfish individuals with private information have to be aggregated towards a social choice.
Clemens Thielen, Sven O. Krumke
doaj   +6 more sources

Common Agency and the Revelation Principle [PDF]

Econometrica, 2001
In the common agency problem multiple mechanism designer simultaneously attempt to control the behavior of a single privately informed agent. The paper shows that the allocations associated with equilibria relative to any ad hoc set of fessible ...
Michael Peters
core   +5 more sources

Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Multi-Agent Case with Transferable Utility [PDF]

Economics Letters, 2007
Bester and Strausz (2000) showed that the revelation principle of Bester and Strausz (2001) does not apply in a setting of many agents and no commitment. In their counterexample only one agent has private information. We show that if the parties can make
Evans, RA, Reiche, SK
core   +7 more sources

Mechanism Design with Sequential-Move Games: Revelation Principle [PDF]

arXiv
Traditionally, mechanism design focuses on simultaneous-move games (e.g., Myerson (1981)). In this paper, we study mechanism design with sequential-move games, and provide two results on revelation principles for general solution concepts (e.g., perfect Bayesian equilibrium, obvious dominance, strong-obvious dominance).
Siyang Xiong
arxiv   +6 more sources

The revelation principle fails when the format of each agent's strategy is an action [PDF]

arXiv, 2020
In mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a social choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of agents' private types. The revelation principle asserts that if a social choice function can be implemented by a mechanism in equilibrium, then there exists a direct mechanism that can truthfully ...
Haoyang Wu
arxiv   +6 more sources

Mechanism Design for Cumulative Prospect Theoretic Agents: A General Framework and the Revelation Principle [PDF]

arXiv, 2021
This paper initiates a discussion of mechanism design when the participating agents exhibit preferences that deviate from expected utility theory (EUT). In particular, we consider mechanism design for systems where the agents are modeled as having cumulative prospect theory (CPT) preferences, which is a generalization of EUT preferences.
Soham R. Phade, Venkat Anantharam
arxiv   +3 more sources

Computational criticisms of the revelation principle [PDF]

Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2004
The revelation principle is a cornerstone tool in mechanism design. It states that one can restrict attention, without loss in the designer’s objective, to mechanisms in which A) the agents report their types completely in a single step up front, and B) the agents are motivated to be truthful.
Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer
openaire   +4 more sources

A Note on Revelation Principle From an Energy Perspective [PDF]

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011
6 ...
Haoyang Wu
  +8 more sources

A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation

Games and Economic Behavior, 2020
We consider probabilistic versions of obviously strategy-proof implementation (Li, 2017) for stochastic rules, and provide an algorithm involving several ideas from the literature (Ashlagi and Gonczarowski, 2018; Pycia and Troyan, 2016; Bade and Gonczarowski, 2017) that converts any such implementation into a randomized round table implementation ...
Andrew Mackenzie
openaire   +4 more sources