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Quantum Bayesian implementation and revelation principle [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011 Bayesian implementation concerns decision making problems when agents have incomplete information. This paper proposes that the traditional sufficient conditions for Bayesian implementation shall be amended by virtue of a quantum Bayesian mechanism.
Haoyang Wu
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Common Agency and the Revelation Principle [PDF]
Econometrica, 1999 In the common agency problem multiple mechanism designer simultaneously attempt to control the behavior of a single privately informed agent. The paper shows that the allocations associated with equilibria relative to any ad hoc set of fessible ...
Michael Peters
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Computational criticisms of the revelation principle [PDF]
Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2004 The revelation principle is a cornerstone tool in mechanism design. It states that one can restrict attention, without loss in the designer’s objective, to mechanisms in which A) the agents report their types completely in a single step up front, and B) the agents are motivated to be truthful.
Vincent Conitzer, Tüomas Sandholm
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Complexity of Strong Implementability [PDF]
Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, 2009 We consider the question of implementability of a social choice function in a classical setting where the preferences of finitely many selfish individuals with private information have to be aggregated towards a social choice.
Clemens Thielen, Sven O. Krumke
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Revelation Principle with Persistent Correlated Types: Impossibility Result [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019 Abstract
Suehyun Kwon
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A Note on Revelation Principle From an Energy Perspective [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011 6 ...
Haoyang Wu
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The Revelation Principle in Multistage Games [PDF]
The Review of Economic Studies, 2020 Abstract The communication revelation principle (RP) of mechanism design states that any outcome that can be implemented using any communication system can also be implemented by an incentive-compatible direct mechanism. In multistage games, we show that in general the communication RP fails for the solution concept of sequential ...
Takuo Sugaya, Alexander Wolitzky
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Mechanism Design with Sequential-Move Games: Revelation Principle [PDF]
SSRN Electronic JournalTraditionally, mechanism design focuses on simultaneous-move games (e.g., Myerson (1981)). In this paper, we study mechanism design with sequential-move games, and provide two results on revelation principles for general solution concepts (e.g., perfect Bayesian equilibrium, obvious dominance, strong-obvious dominance).
Siyang Xiong
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Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Multi-Agent Case with Transferable Utility [PDF]
, 2007 Bester and Strausz (2000) showed that the revelation principle of Bester and Strausz (2001) does not apply in a setting of many agents and no commitment. In their counterexample only one agent has private information. We show that if the parties can make
Robert Evans, Sönje Reich
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Deterministic Mechanisms, the Revelation Principle, and Ex-Post Constraints [PDF]
Economics Letters, 2017 This note establishes a revelation principle in terms of payoff for deterministic mechanisms under ex-post constraints: the maximal payoff implementable by a feasible deterministic mechanism can also be implemented by a feasible deterministic direct mechanism.
Felix Jarman, Vincent Meisner
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