Results 11 to 20 of about 188,749 (321)
The revelation principle and regularity conditions [PDF]
, 2005 The revelation principle asserts that every outcome brought by a mechanism is realized by a truthful direct mechanism. The present paper investigates the regularity conditions of these two mechanisms in the continuous space of the agent’s type.
Naoki Kojima
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2003 We challenge the popular view that because of the revelation principle, the research on earnings management must be restricted only to situations in which a truth-telling, fully revealing equilibrium/i> does not exist. After presenting and discussing the revelation principle, we state conditions under which truth-telling equilibria may be dominated
Tavy Ronen, Varda Yaari
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A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
Games and Economic Behavior, 2020 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Andrew Mackenzie
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Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Clauses and the Revelation Principle
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011 We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information in which each agent can at most participate with one principal. In such contexts, we show that the restriction to direct truthful mechanisms involves a loss of generality, even if one only focuses on pure strategy equilibria.
Andréa Attar +2 more
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A Revelation Principle for Dominant Strategy Implementation [PDF]
, 2008 We introduce a perfect price discriminating (PPD) mechanism for allocation problems with private information. A PPD mechanism treats a seller, for example, as a perfect price discriminating monopolist who faces a price schedule that does not depend on her report.
Jesse A. Schwartz, Quan Wen
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Fuzzy Verification and the Sharp Revelation Principle
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018 We introduce a model of probabilistic verification in a mechanism design setting. The principal verifies the agent's claims with statistical tests. The agent's probability of passing each test depends on his type. In our framework, the revelation principle holds.
Ian Ball, Deniz Kattwinkel
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Sequential Common Agency: The Revelation Principle
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2006 The paper extends the Revelation Principle to sequential common agency games under asymmetric information. Each period a principal contracts with a common agent. An implemented allocation is observed by other principals. Depending on whether the message reported by the agent to a principal is observed by other principals, we distinguish between private
Anastasia V. Kartasheva
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Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle [PDF]
This paper extends the revelation principle to environments in which the mechanism designer cannot fully commit to the outcome induced by the mechanism.
Helmut Bester, Roland Strausz
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The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2001 In the context of common agency adverse-selection games weillustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to studyequilibria of the multi-principal games.
Martimort, David, Stole, Lars
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The Principle of Adaptation in Revelation [PDF]
The Biblical World, 1900 G. S. Rollins
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