Results 281 to 290 of about 263,686 (317)
Fuzzy Verification and the Sharp Revelation Principle
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018 We introduce a model of probabilistic verification in a mechanism design setting. The principal verifies the agent's claims with statistical tests. The agent's probability of passing each test depends on his type. In our framework, the revelation principle holds.
Deniz Kattwinkel, Ian Ball
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Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
Econometrica, 2001 This paper extends the revelation principle to environments in which the mechanism designer cannot fully commit to the outcome induced by the mechanism. We show that he may optimally use a direct mechanism under which truthful revelation is an optimal strategy for the agent. In contrast with the conventional revelation principle, however, the agent may
Roland Strausz, Helmut Bester
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Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case
Economics Letters, 2000 Abstract We consider mechanism design problems with n agents when the mechanism designer cannot fully commit to an allocation function. With a single agent (n=1) optimal mechanisms can always be represented by direct mechanisms, under which each agent’s message set is the set of his possible types [Bester, H., Strausz, R., 2000.
Helmut Bester, Roland Strausz
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Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Clauses and the Revelation Principle
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011 We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information in which each agent can at most participate with one principal. In such contexts, we show that the restriction to direct truthful mechanisms involves a loss of generality, even if one only focuses on pure strategy equilibria.
Andrea Attar +2 more
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Bugs in the proofs of revelation principle [PDF]
, 2010 In the field of mechanism design, the revelation principle has been known for decades. Myerson, Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green gave formal proofs of the revelation principle. However, in this paper, we argue that there are serious bugs hidden in their proofs.
Haoyang Wu
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earnings management and the revelation principle [PDF]
Review of Accounting Studies, 1998 When the Revelation Principle (RP) holds, managing earnings confers no advantage over revelation. We construct an explanation for earnings management that is based on limitations on owners' ability to make commitments (a violation of the RP's assumptions).
Jonathan C. Glover +2 more
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The Revelation Principle for Mechanism Design with Signaling Costs
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2021The revelation principle is a key tool in mechanism design. It allows the designer to restrict attention to truthful mechanisms, greatly facilitating analysis. This is also borne out algorithmically, allowing certain computational problems in mechanism design to be solved in polynomial time.
KephartAndrew, ConitzerVincent
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Limitations of the revelation principle
Economics Letters, 1992Abstract The validity of the revelation principle in ‘non-Bayesian environments’ is clarified, with respect to weak Nash-implementation - not necessarily in strategy rules - of social choice functions.
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