Results 241 to 250 of about 245,698 (281)

Simple Backdoors on RSA Modulus by Using RSA Vulnerability

IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences, 2009
This investigation proposes two methods for embedding backdoors in the RSA modulus N=pq rather than in the public exponent e. This strategy not only permits manufacturers to embed backdoors in an RSA system, but also allows users to choose any desired public exponent, such as e=216+1, to ensure efficient encryption.
Hung-Min Sun, Mu-En Wu, Cheng-Ta Yang
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A New Attack on RSA and CRT-RSA

2012
In RSA, the public modulus N=pq is the product of two primes of the same bit-size, the public exponent e and the private exponent d satisfy $ed\equiv 1 \pmod{(p - 1)(q - 1)}$. In many applications of RSA, d is chosen to be small.
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Cryptanalysis of Dual RSA

Designs, Codes and Cryptography, 2016
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Liqiang Peng, Lei Hu 0003, Yao Lu 0002, Jun Xu 0022, Zhangjie Huang   +4 more
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Short-Exponent RSA

IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences, 2009
In some applications, a short private exponent d is chosen to improve the decryption or signing process for RSA public key cryptosystem. However, in a typical RSA, if the private exponent d is selected first, the public exponent e should be of the same order of magnitude as φ(N). Sun et al.
Hung-Min Sun, Cheng-Ta Yang, Mu-En Wu
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Generalised Cycling Attacks on RSA and Strong RSA Primes

1999
Given an RSA modulus n, a ciphertext c and the encryption exponent e, one can construct the sequence x0 = c mod n, xi+1 = xie mod n; i = 0, 1,... until gcd(xi+1 - x0, n) ≠ 1 or i or i > B, B a given boundary. If i ≤ B, there are two cases. Case 1: gcd(xi+1 -x0, n) = n. In this case xi = m and the secret message m can be recovered. Case 2: 1 ≠ gcd(xi+1 -
Marc Gysin, Jennifer Seberry
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RSA cryptography and multi prime RSA cryptography

AIP Conference Proceedings, 2017
RSA cryptography is one of the most powerful and popular cryptosystem which is being applied until now. There is one variant of RSA cryptography named Multi Prime RSA (MPRSA) cryptography. MPRSA cryptography is the improved version of RSA cryptography.
Nur Atiqah Abdul Sani, Hailiza Kamarulhaili   +1 more
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Tunable Balancing of RSA

2005
We propose a key generation method for RSA moduli which allows the cost of the public operations (encryption/verifying) and the private operations (decryption/signing) to be balanced according to the application requirements. Our method is a generalisation of using small public exponents and small Chinese remainder (CRT) private exponents.
Steven D. Galbraith, Chris Heneghan, James F. McKee   +2 more
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On the Distribution of the RSA Generator

1999
Let 19, m and e be integers such that gcd(19, m) = 1. Then one can define the sequence (un) by the recurrence relation $${{u}_{n}} \equiv u_{{n - 1}}^{e}\left( {\,\bmod \,m} \right),0{{u}_{n}}m - 1,n = 1,2,..., $$ (1) with theinitial value \({{u}_{0}} = \nu \).
John B. Friedlander, Daniel Lieman, Igor E. Shparlinski   +2 more
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Padding attacks on RSA

Information Security Technical Report, 1999
Abstract This paper presents a non-technical overview of the recent attacks against RSA encryption and signature standards. It is intended as both a system design aid and a temporary reference text beginning at a level suitable for engineers, risk managers and system architects with no or little previous exposure to padding attacks.
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Implementing the RSA cryptosystem

Computers & Security, 1987
Techniques for a software implementation of the RSA cryptosystem are presented. They allow both space and time requirements of the RSA scheme to be minimized. A hash function to be used in connection with the cryptosystem is presented; this function avoids weaknesses of other hash functions published previously.
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