Results 11 to 20 of about 1,686 (117)
Maximally Satisfying Lower Quotas in the Hospitals/Residents Problem with Ties [PDF]
, 2022 Motivated by the serious problem that hospitals in rural areas suffer from a shortage of residents, we study the Hospitals/Residents model in which hospitals are associated with lower quotas and the objective is to satisfy them as much as possible.
Goko, Hiromichi +3 more
core +1 more source
Does hospital ownership affect patient experience? An investigation into public-private sector differences in England. [PDF]
, 2013 Using patient experience survey data, the paper investigates whether hospital ownership affects the level of quality reported by patients whose care is funded by the National Health Service in areas other than clinical quality.
Reeves, Rachel +9 more
core +1 more source
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
, 2020 We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.Roth
Klijn, Flip +2 more
core +2 more sources
On the (Parameterized) Complexity of Almost Stable Marriage [PDF]
, 2020 In the Stable Marriage problem, when the preference lists are complete, all agents of the smaller side can be matched. However, this need not be true when preference lists are incomplete.
Gupta, Sushmita +4 more
core +1 more source
Competitive Equilibria in Matching Models with Financial Constraints [PDF]
, 2019 We consider the one-to-one two-sided matching with contracts model in which buyers face financial constraints. In this model there is a stable outcome, but not necessarily a competitive equilibrium as defined in the standard way.
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, Zhou, Yu
core +1 more source
A Many-to-many 'rural hospital theorem'
, 2021 We show that the full version of the so-called 'rural hospital theorem' (Roth, 1986) generalizes to many-to-many matching where agents on both sides of the market have separable and substitutable ...
Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica +2 more
core
, 2020 We propose a solution to the conflict between fairness and efficiency in one-sided matching markets. A matching is essentially stable if any priority-based claim initiates a chain of reassignments that results in the initial claimant losing the object ...
David Delacrétaz +6 more
core +1 more source
, 2020 This paper studies many-to-one matching markets where each student is assigned to a hospital. Each hospital has possibly multiple positions and responsive preferences. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism.
Klijn, Flip +2 more
core +1 more source
A Joint Test of Unconfoundedness and Common Trends
Journal of Applied Econometrics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We introduce an overidentification test of two alternative assumptions to identify the average treatment effect on the treated in a two‐period panel data setting: unconfoundedness and common trends. Under unconfoundedness, treatment assignment and post‐treatment outcomes are independent, conditional on control variables and pre‐treatment ...
Martin Huber, Eva‐Maria Oeß
wiley +1 more source
Journal of Advanced Nursing, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Aim To examine the impact of delays in intensive care unit (ICU) admission on patient outcomes, specifically clinical deterioration and mortality among patients transferred from the emergency department (ED) or general wards following acute deterioration in an Australian public hospital.
Shivaprasad Anagi +8 more
wiley +1 more source