Results 61 to 70 of about 137 (96)
Sceptical Theism and the ‘Too-Much-Scepticism’ Objection
, 2020 Abstract The most prominent objection against sceptical theism is that the sceptical theses typically adduced in support of it have ramifications that range far more widely than sceptical theists hope or should tolerate: they lead to scepticism about various aspects of commonsense morality, about divine honesty and goodness, about the ...
Michael C Rea
exaly +3 more sources
Sceptical Theism and Evidential Arguments from Evil [PDF]
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2003 Sceptical theists--e.g., William Alston and Michael Bergmann--have claimed that considerations concerning human cognitive limitations are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil. We argue that, if the considerations deployed by sceptical theists are sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations ...
Graham Oppy
exaly +4 more sources
In Defence of Sceptical Theism
, 2020 Abstract Some evidential arguments from evil rely on an inference of the following sort: ‘If, after thinking hard, we can’t think of any God-justifying reason for permitting some horrific evil then it is likely that there is no such reason.’ Sceptical theists, ourselves included, say that this inference is not a good one and that ...
Michael C. Rea
exaly +3 more sources
Sceptical theism and divine lies
Religious Studies, 2010 AbstractIn this paper I develop a novel challenge for sceptical theists. I present a line of reasoning that appeals to sceptical theism to support scepticism about divine assertions. I claim that this reasoning is at least as plausible as one popular sceptical theistic strategy for responding to evidential arguments from evil.
ERIK J. WIELENBERG
openaire +2 more sources
Sceptical theism and divine truths
Religious Studies, 2011 AbstractSceptical theism has been employed by its adherents in an argument aimed at undermining the so called ‘noseeum inference’. Erik Wielenberg (2010) has recently argued that there is an equally plausible argument for the conclusion that sceptical theism implies that we do not know any proposition that has word-of-God justification only.
AARON SEGAL
openaire +2 more sources
Sceptical theism and the evil-god challenge [PDF]
Religious Studies, 2018 AbstractThis article is a response to Stephen Law's article ‘The evil-god challenge’. In his article, Law argues that if belief in evil-god is unreasonable, then belief in good-god is unreasonable; that the antecedent is true; and hence so is the consequent.
PERRY HENDRICKS
core +3 more sources
The Problem of Evil & Sceptical Theism
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 2017 AbstractThe problem of evil is the problem of reconciling the existence of a perfect God with the existence of horrible things in the world. Many take this problem as a convincing reason to be an atheist. But others think that the problem can be solved. One prominent solution is called ‘sceptical theism’.
Justin McBrayer
openaire +2 more sources
‘God told me to do it’: sceptical theism and perceiving God
Religious Studies, 2011 AbstractIn this article I highlight a tension between Alston's core thesis in his seminal book Perceiving God – that beliefs about God formed on the basis of mystical perception are prima facie justified – and a currently popular method for disarming a certain form of the argument from evil, a method which involves adopting a view known as sceptical ...
JOSHUA SEIGAL
openaire +2 more sources
, 2018 Sceptical theists are theists who are sceptical of our abilities to discern whether the evils in our world constitute good evidence against the existence of God. According to sceptical theists, the human mind is limited in such a way that it would not at all be surprising that God would have reasons that are beyond our understanding for allowing the ...
Justin McBrayer
openaire +2 more sources
Sceptical Theism, the Butterfly Effect and Bracketing the Unknown
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 2017 AbstractSceptical theism claims that we have vast ignorance about the realm of value and the connections, causal and modal, between goods and bads. This ignorance makes it reasonable for a theist to say that God has reasons beyond our ken for allowing the horrendous evils we observe. But if so, then does this not lead to moral paralysis when we need to
Alexander R. Pruss
openaire +2 more sources