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Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 1989 Self-deception looks mysterious and paradoxical because it doesn't seem possible to deceive yourself and be deceived. As the deceiver you have to know that you are hiding something from someone. But as the deceived you cannot know what is hidden, or else you are not deceived. In this work, we will argue that deceiving oneself is not self-contradictory:
Silver Maury, Sabini John, Miceli Maria
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Self-deception and self-knowledge
Philosophical Studies, 2011 The aim of this paper is to provide an account of a certain variety of self-deception based on a model of self-knowledge. According to this model, one thinks that one has a belief on the basis of one’s grounds for that belief.
Jorge Fernandez
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The Philosophical Quarterly, 1983
Philosophical work on self-deception revolves around a trio of questions. What is self-deception? Is self-deception possible? How are instances of self-deception to be explained? The extent to which self-deception is analogous to interpersonal deception is controversial, partly because certain analogies threaten to render the possibility of self ...
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Philosophical work on self-deception revolves around a trio of questions. What is self-deception? Is self-deception possible? How are instances of self-deception to be explained? The extent to which self-deception is analogous to interpersonal deception is controversial, partly because certain analogies threaten to render the possibility of self ...
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2009
Abstract Is self-deception really a matter of deliberately getting oneself to believe something contrary to something else one already believes and, if so, how can one succeed at it? Colloquial phrases for it, like ‘fooling yourself’ and ‘lying to yourself’, evoke paradox. Although this article stresses the more recent philosophical work
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Abstract Is self-deception really a matter of deliberately getting oneself to believe something contrary to something else one already believes and, if so, how can one succeed at it? Colloquial phrases for it, like ‘fooling yourself’ and ‘lying to yourself’, evoke paradox. Although this article stresses the more recent philosophical work
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1974
People do, quite naturally and not uncommonly, speak of other people as deceiving themselves, as being their own dupes. A man's child is ill and growing constantly worse. The father keeps talking optimistically about the future, keeps explaining away the evidence, and keeps pointing to what he insists are signs of improvement.
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People do, quite naturally and not uncommonly, speak of other people as deceiving themselves, as being their own dupes. A man's child is ill and growing constantly worse. The father keeps talking optimistically about the future, keeps explaining away the evidence, and keeps pointing to what he insists are signs of improvement.
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2016
AbstractChapter 16 proposes an analysis of self-deception. Self-deceived states (and not just their contents) are contradictory states. The model’s ramifications are explored, and it is related to the neighborhood semantics of chapter 15.
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AbstractChapter 16 proposes an analysis of self-deception. Self-deceived states (and not just their contents) are contradictory states. The model’s ramifications are explored, and it is related to the neighborhood semantics of chapter 15.
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