Results 21 to 30 of about 39,547 (142)

A gagueira sob diferentes olhares: análise comparativa das abordagens de quatro autoras Stuttering under different prisms: the comparative analysis based on four specialists

open access: yesRevista CEFAC, 2007
OBJETIVO: analisar comparativamente quatro abordagens em gagueira quanto aos aspectos definição, etiologia, avaliação, terapia; demonstrar justificativas para a ausência de disfluências gagas no monólogo.
Rosivânia de Almeida Moraes   +1 more
doaj   +1 more source

Aristotle on Identity and Persistence [PDF]

open access: yes, 2008
In Physics 4.11, Aristotle discusses a sophistical puzzle in which "being Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum is different from being Coriscus-in-the-market-place." I take this puzzle to threaten the persistence of changing entities.
Bowin, John
core   +1 more source

The many faces of the Liar Paradox

open access: yesPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology
The Liar Paradox is a classic argument that creates a contradiction by reflection on a sentence that attributes falsity to itself: ‘this sentence is false’.
José Martínez-Fernández, Sergi Oms
doaj   +1 more source

Non‐Classical Knowledge [PDF]

open access: yes, 2017
The Knower paradox purports to place surprising a priori limitations on what we can know. According to orthodoxy, it shows that we need to abandon one of three plausible and widely-held ideas: that knowledge is factive, that we can know that knowledge is
Jerzak, Ethan
core   +1 more source

Is Anal Retentive Hyphenated? : Self-Referential Humor [PDF]

open access: yes, 2004
You know about self-referential statements. The classic examples are the Greek logical paradoxes. The Epimenides Paradox, in one variant, asserts: This sentence is false.
Hauptman, Don
core   +1 more source

A short remark on Gödel incompleteness theorem and its self-referential paradox from Neutrosophic Logic perspective

open access: yesInternational Journal of Neutrosophic Science, 2019
It is known from history of mathematics, that Gödel submitted his two incompleteness theorems, which can be considered as one of hallmarks of modern mathematics in 20th century. Here we argue that Gödel incompleteness theorem and its self-referential paradox have not only put Hilbert’s axiomatic program into question, but he also opened up the problem ...
Christianto, Victor   +1 more
openaire   +2 more sources

Topology of the We: Ur-Ich, Pre-Subjectivity, and Knot Structures

open access: yesOpen Philosophy
The concept of the collective “we” has recently gained renewed attention through philosophy’s we-turn, as proposed by Yasuo Deguchi, raising new questions about the nature of intersubjectivity and shared experience. This article revisits Edmund Husserl’s
Kim Hye Young
doaj   +1 more source

A Non-Self-Referential Paradox in Epistemic Game Theory

open access: yesReports on Mathematical Logic, 2017
In game theory, the notion of a player's beliefs about the game players' beliefs about other players' beliefs arises naturally. In this paper, we present a non-self-referential paradox in epistemic game theory which shows that completely modeling players' epistemic beliefs and assumptions is impossible. Furthermore, we introduce an interactive temporal
openaire   +3 more sources

"The Paradox of Self-Consciousness" by José Luis Burmùdez [PDF]

open access: yes, 2001
What José Luis Bermúdez calls the paradox of self-consciousness is essentially the conflict between two claims: (1) The capacity to use first-personal referential devices like “I” must be explained in terms of the capacity to think first-person
Crane, Tim
core  

Paradoxes, Self-Referentiality, and Hybrid Systems: A Constructive Approach

open access: yesOpen Journal of Philosophy, 2017
Since the discovery of the paradoxes of self-referentiality or self-reference respectively logicians and mathematicians tried to avoid self-reference when constructing formal systems. Yet “real” complex systems like the mind are characterized by self-reference and can accordingly only be modeled by formal systems that are also basically self ...
openaire   +1 more source

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