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Sequential Auctions and Auction Design [PDF]
Often an auction designer has the option of selling, or purchasing, those lots available in one auction or a sequence of auctions. In addition, bidder opportunities will not be static, in part due to arrival of information, but also because bidders can face deadlines for making decisions.
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Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2011
Mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions (MMUCAs) offer a high potential to be employed for the automated assembly of supply chains of agents. However, in order for mixed auctions to be effectively applied to supply chain formation, we must ensure computational tractability and reduce bidders' uncertainty.
Boris Mikhaylov +2 more
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Mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions (MMUCAs) offer a high potential to be employed for the automated assembly of supply chains of agents. However, in order for mixed auctions to be effectively applied to supply chain formation, we must ensure computational tractability and reduce bidders' uncertainty.
Boris Mikhaylov +2 more
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Stochastic synergies in sequential auctions
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2004We consider sequential construction contracts in which bidders may benefit from one auction to the next due to synergistic tasks across the projects auctioned. Theoretical considerations indicate that winners in the former auctions are more likely to participate in latter auctions.
De Silva, Dakshina G. +2 more
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Ordering Sellers in Sequential Auctions
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Gong, Qiang, Tan, Xu, Xing, Yiqing
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Sequential Incremental-Value Auctions
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2010We study the distributed allocation of tasks to cooperating robots in real time, where each task has to be assigned to exactly one robot so that the sum of the latencies of all tasks is as small as possible. We propose a new auction-like algorithm, called Sequential Incremental-Value (SIV) auction, which assigns tasks to robots in ...
Xiaoming Zheng, Sven Koenig
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Mimic Martingales in Sequential Auctions
Economic TheoryIt is known that in the equilibrium of a game, no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from equilibrium play. Of course, players may not have a positive incentive to pursue an equilibrium when every other player pursues an equilibrium, for example, as in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. In this paper, the authors consider the incentives of
Matt Van Essen, John Wooders
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Sequential Auctions of Endogenously Valued Objects
Games and Economic Behavior, 2001This paper studies the determination of price and market share in a market where well-informed duopolists or bid duopolists bid sequentially for the trade of a finite number of buyers and sellers. It is shown that the two buyers are most aggressive in bidding for the early units, regardless of the schedule of prizes.
Ian L. Gale, Mark Stegeman
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PREDATORY BIDDING IN SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS
Oxford Economic Papers, 1994The work presented in this paper suggests that participation costs may have important, and perhaps surprising, effects on the types of equilibria that can exist in sequential auction models. It is shown that when two units of an item are auctioned in two consecutive English auctions and buyers' valuations are independently distributed and private ...
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Sequential Auctions with Synergy and Affiliation across Auctions
Journal of Political Economy, 2021This paper performs a structural analysis of sequential auctions with both synergy and affiliation across auctions.
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Selling Order in a Sequential Auction
In a second-price sequential auction with both global and local bidders, we explore the optimal order for selling heterogeneous goods to maximize efficiency or revenue. Our findings indicate that selling the good with very small variance (almost-zero variance) first yields higher revenue, while selling it second results in an efficient outcome with ...Gunay, Hikmet, Meng, Xin, Perez, Victor
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