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Machine learning-based prediction models for liver-related events in patients with hepatitis B-related cirrhosis and clinically significant portal hypertension. [PDF]
World J GastroenterolLi YQ, Li ZJ, Li YQ, Feng Y, Wang XB.
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Digital breast tomosynthesis-based radiomics for prediction of prognosis in breast cancer: a multicenter study. [PDF]
Gland SurgLi J +13 more
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Consistent Restricted Shapley Values
Mathematical Social Sciences, 1994zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Derks, J., Peters, H.
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2003
The Shapley value, introduced in the fifties (Cf. Shapley (1953)), is one of the most interesting solution concepts in cooperative game theory which has drawn much attention. See for example A. Roth (1988). The Shapley value associates to each n-person game one (payoff) vector in ℝ n .
Bezalel Peleg, Peter Sudhölter
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The Shapley value, introduced in the fifties (Cf. Shapley (1953)), is one of the most interesting solution concepts in cooperative game theory which has drawn much attention. See for example A. Roth (1988). The Shapley value associates to each n-person game one (payoff) vector in ℝ n .
Bezalel Peleg, Peter Sudhölter
+4 more sources
On the Aumann–Shapley value [PDF]
Positivity, 2008 This paper generalizes Theorem A in [\textit{R. J. Aumann} and \textit{L. S. Shapley}, Values of non-atomic games. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press (1974; Zbl 0311.90084), p. 20], where the underlying space is an algebra of subsets isomorphic to \(([0,1], \mathcal{B})\), \(\mathcal{B}\) the Borel sets.
A. Basile +2 more
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2018
The value introduced by Shapley is still one of the most popular solution concepts for cooperative games. As a well-defined, always nonempty solution, it is an attractive solution that is supported by a fine axiomatisation and is a model that has also been implemented.
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The value introduced by Shapley is still one of the most popular solution concepts for cooperative games. As a well-defined, always nonempty solution, it is an attractive solution that is supported by a fine axiomatisation and is a model that has also been implemented.
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2015
In Chap. 16 set-valued solution concepts for games with transferable utilities were studied: the imputation set, core, domination core, and stable sets. In this chapter, a one-point (single-valued) solution concept is discussed: the Shapley value. It may again be helpful to first study the relevant parts of Chaps. 1 and 9.
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In Chap. 16 set-valued solution concepts for games with transferable utilities were studied: the imputation set, core, domination core, and stable sets. In this chapter, a one-point (single-valued) solution concept is discussed: the Shapley value. It may again be helpful to first study the relevant parts of Chaps. 1 and 9.
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2001
It is evident that the vagueness of coalitional pay-offs implies also the vagueness of such concept like the vector of Shapley values. Its formal reformulation into the language of fuzzy coalition game theory appears to be obvious and purely mechanical. Anyhow, it is worth some closer attention.
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It is evident that the vagueness of coalitional pay-offs implies also the vagueness of such concept like the vector of Shapley values. Its formal reformulation into the language of fuzzy coalition game theory appears to be obvious and purely mechanical. Anyhow, it is worth some closer attention.
openaire +1 more source