Results 201 to 210 of about 5,495 (233)

Shared Intentionality, joint commitment, and directed obligation

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2020
Abstract Tomasello frequently refers to joint commitment, but does not fully characterize it. In earlier publications, I have offered a detailed account of joint commitment, tying it to a sense that the parties form a “we,” and arguing that it grounds directed obligations and rights.
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Early development of shared intentionality with peers

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2005
In their account of the origins of human collaborative abilities, Tomasello et al. rely heavily on reasoning and evidence from adult–child collaborations. Peer collaborations are not discussed, but early peer collaborations differ from early adult–child collaborations.
Celia A. Brownell, Sara Nichols, Margarita Svetlova   +2 more
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Illusions of intentionality, shared and unshared

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2005
Intention, shared or unshared, is based on the presumption of unknowable and unnecessary motives and mental states in ourselves and others.
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Is shared intentionality widespread among and unique to humans?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2005
We agree that motivation to share emotions and other mental states is crucial for communicative development, but human infants are highly selective in sharing mental states, and this is well taken evolutionarily. Young chimpanzees may also have motivation to imitate mothers.
Giyoo Hatano, Keiko Takahashi
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The Gap is Social: Human Shared Intentionality and Culture

2009
Human beings share many cognitive skills with their nearest primate relatives, especially those for dealing with the physical world of objects (and categories and quantities of objects) in space and their causal interrelations. But humans are, in addition, biologically adapted for cultural life in ways that other primates are not.
Michael Tomasello, Henrike Moll
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Language first, then shared intentionality, then a beneficent spiral

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2005
Tomasello et al. give a good account of how shared intentionality develops in children, but a much weaker one of how it might have evolved. They are unduly hasty in dismissing the emergence of language as a triggering factor. An alternative account is suggested in which language provided the spark, but thereafter language and shared intentionality ...
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Empathy, Shared Intentionality, and Motivation by Moral Reasons

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2011
Internalists about reasons generally insist that if a putative reason, R, is to count as a genuine normative reason for a particular agent to do something, then R must make a rational connection to some desire or interest of the agent in question. If internalism is true, but moral reasons purport to apply to agents independently of the particular ...
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Collective intentionality vs. intersubjective intentionality and social intentionality. An account of collective intentionality as shared intentionality

2011
I will shed light on the phenomenon of collective intentionality, which, in the philosophical, cognitive sciences and neurosciences debate, is often confused with similar yet diverse phenomena, i.e. with inter-subjective intentionality, also called social cognition, and with social intentionality.
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Shared Intentionality in Nonhuman Great Apes: a Normative Model

Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2021
Dennis Papadopoulos
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Neuronal Coherence Agent for Shared Intentionality: A Hypothesis of Neurobiological Processes Occurring during Social Interaction

OBM Neurobiology, 2021
Igor Val Danilov, Sandra Mihailova, Mihailova Sandra   +2 more
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