Results 241 to 250 of about 96,315 (278)
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
Dual EEG alignment between participants during shared intentionality experiments
Brain Research, 2022Electroencephalograph (EEG) analysis from human subjects have demonstrated that beta oscillations carried perceptual information across the cortex featuring amplitude and phase modulation occurrences when subjects are engaged in task-oriented activities.
Mark, H Myers, Gahangir, Hossain
openaire +2 more sources
Causality analysis during shared intentionality
2016 12th World Congress on Intelligent Control and Automation (WCICA), 2016Causal interaction between different brain regions has received wide attention recently. Granger causality (GC) is one of the most popular methods to explore causality relationship between different brain regions. New causality (NC) proposed by Hu et. al was shown to be better reveal true causality than GC.
Huihui Zhuo +6 more
openaire +1 more source
Shared Intentionality, joint commitment, and directed obligation
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2020Abstract Tomasello frequently refers to joint commitment, but does not fully characterize it. In earlier publications, I have offered a detailed account of joint commitment, tying it to a sense that the parties form a “we,” and arguing that it grounds directed obligations and rights.
openaire +2 more sources
Coevolution of language and intentionality sharing
2009 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, 2009We conduct an evolutionary simulation to explore the coevolution of language and a language-related ability, intentionality sharing. Our simulation shows that during the evolution of a simple informative language, communicative success helps optimize the level of intentionality sharing in the population.
Wang, WSY, Gong, T, Minett, JW
openaire +2 more sources
Rethinking Human Development and the Shared Intentionality Hypothesis
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2020In his recent book “Becoming Human” Michael Tomasello delivers an updated version of his shared intentionality (SI) account of uniquely human cognition. More so than in earlier writings, the author embraces the idea that SI shapes not just our social cognition but all domains of thought and emotion.
Henrike Moll +2 more
openaire +1 more source
Early development of shared intentionality with peers
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2005In their account of the origins of human collaborative abilities, Tomasello et al. rely heavily on reasoning and evidence from adult–child collaborations. Peer collaborations are not discussed, but early peer collaborations differ from early adult–child collaborations.
Celia A. Brownell +2 more
openaire +1 more source
Illusions of intentionality, shared and unshared
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2005Intention, shared or unshared, is based on the presumption of unknowable and unnecessary motives and mental states in ourselves and others.
openaire +1 more source
Imitation and Shared Intentionality in the Acheulean
Cambridge Archaeological Journal, 2010Imitation and shared intentionality are traits essential to the socio-cultural adaptation of Homo sapiens. Non-human apes display some capacity for imitation and shared intentionality, but are deficient in comparison to Homo sapiens. The Acheulean archaeological record provides evidence that imitation and shared intentionality were part of the ...
openaire +2 more sources
Organizational Context, Employer-Employee Shared Intentionality, and Well-Being Perceptions
Academy of Management Proceedings, 2018The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between well- being initiatives (WBI) and employees’ perceptions of WBI in different organizational contexts.
Fabiola Bertolotti +2 more
openaire +2 more sources
Empathy, Shared Intentionality, and Motivation by Moral Reasons
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2011Internalists about reasons generally insist that if a putative reason, R, is to count as a genuine normative reason for a particular agent to do something, then R must make a rational connection to some desire or interest of the agent in question. If internalism is true, but moral reasons purport to apply to agents independently of the particular ...
openaire +1 more source

