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Dual EEG alignment between participants during shared intentionality experiments

Brain Research, 2022
Electroencephalograph (EEG) analysis from human subjects have demonstrated that beta oscillations carried perceptual information across the cortex featuring amplitude and phase modulation occurrences when subjects are engaged in task-oriented activities.
Mark, H Myers, Gahangir, Hossain
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Causality analysis during shared intentionality

2016 12th World Congress on Intelligent Control and Automation (WCICA), 2016
Causal interaction between different brain regions has received wide attention recently. Granger causality (GC) is one of the most popular methods to explore causality relationship between different brain regions. New causality (NC) proposed by Hu et. al was shown to be better reveal true causality than GC.
Huihui Zhuo   +6 more
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Shared Intentionality, joint commitment, and directed obligation

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2020
Abstract Tomasello frequently refers to joint commitment, but does not fully characterize it. In earlier publications, I have offered a detailed account of joint commitment, tying it to a sense that the parties form a “we,” and arguing that it grounds directed obligations and rights.
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Coevolution of language and intentionality sharing

2009 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, 2009
We conduct an evolutionary simulation to explore the coevolution of language and a language-related ability, intentionality sharing. Our simulation shows that during the evolution of a simple informative language, communicative success helps optimize the level of intentionality sharing in the population.
Wang, WSY, Gong, T, Minett, JW
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Rethinking Human Development and the Shared Intentionality Hypothesis

Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2020
In his recent book “Becoming Human” Michael Tomasello delivers an updated version of his shared intentionality (SI) account of uniquely human cognition. More so than in earlier writings, the author embraces the idea that SI shapes not just our social cognition but all domains of thought and emotion.
Henrike Moll   +2 more
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Early development of shared intentionality with peers

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2005
In their account of the origins of human collaborative abilities, Tomasello et al. rely heavily on reasoning and evidence from adult–child collaborations. Peer collaborations are not discussed, but early peer collaborations differ from early adult–child collaborations.
Celia A. Brownell   +2 more
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Illusions of intentionality, shared and unshared

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2005
Intention, shared or unshared, is based on the presumption of unknowable and unnecessary motives and mental states in ourselves and others.
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Imitation and Shared Intentionality in the Acheulean

Cambridge Archaeological Journal, 2010
Imitation and shared intentionality are traits essential to the socio-cultural adaptation of Homo sapiens. Non-human apes display some capacity for imitation and shared intentionality, but are deficient in comparison to Homo sapiens. The Acheulean archaeological record provides evidence that imitation and shared intentionality were part of the ...
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Organizational Context, Employer-Employee Shared Intentionality, and Well-Being Perceptions

Academy of Management Proceedings, 2018
The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between well- being initiatives (WBI) and employees’ perceptions of WBI in different organizational contexts.
Fabiola Bertolotti   +2 more
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Empathy, Shared Intentionality, and Motivation by Moral Reasons

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2011
Internalists about reasons generally insist that if a putative reason, R, is to count as a genuine normative reason for a particular agent to do something, then R must make a rational connection to some desire or interest of the agent in question. If internalism is true, but moral reasons purport to apply to agents independently of the particular ...
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