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Liquidity and Shareholder Activism [PDF]
Blockholders' incentives to intervene in corporate governance are weakened by free-rider problems and high costs of activism. Theory suggests activists may recoup expenses through informed trading of target firms' stock when stocks are liquid. We show that stock liquidity increases the probability of activism, but less so for potentially overvalued ...
Charlotte Ostergaard+3 more
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Shareholder Theory/Shareholder Value
Shareholder theory states that the primary objective of management is to maximize shareholder value. This objective ranks in front of the interests of other corporate stakeholders, such as employees, suppliers, customers, and society.Shareholder theory argues that shareholders are the ultimate owners of a corporate’s assets, and thus, the priority for ...
O'Connell, Maeve, Ward, Anne Marie
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Shareholder rights, shareholder voting, and corporate performance [PDF]
The areas of shareholder rights and shareholder voting are fundamental features of a sound corporate governance system. The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance 2004) state that ‘the corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights’ and amongst ...
Mallin, C., Melis, Andrea
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Shareholder Rights and the Importance of Foreign Shareholders [PDF]
In many countries shareholders were offered more rights to protect their position against “inappropriate” behaviour of other corporate constituents. Whether these developments resulted in more market participation and deeper and more liquid markets, as argued in law and finance theory, remained an open question.
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Shareholder Rights and Shareholder Activism: The Role of the General Meeting of Shareholders [PDF]
An appropriate division of power between the board of directors and shareholders of the company is quintessential for the success of the company. However, for a long period of time the monitoring powers of the shareholders were limited. Recently, both the European and the national member states’ legislators refined corporate law and allocated more ...
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An Analysis of Shareholder Agreements [PDF]
Shareholder agreements govern the relations among shareholders in privately-held firms, such as joint ventures or venture capital-backed firms. We provide an explanation for the use of put and call options, tag-along rights, drag-along rights, demand rights, piggy-back rights, and catch-up clauses in shareholder agreements.
Alexander Ljungqvist+5 more
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Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills [PDF]
Shareholder bylaws limiting or directing board action raise a tough and fascinating question of statutory interpretation under state law as well as an important policy question. In particular, over the last decade shareholders have sought to use bylaws to limit poison pills and to grant shareholders access to the corporate proxy materials to nominate ...
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Trading and Shareholder Democracy
ABSTRACTWe study shareholder voting in a model in which trading affects the composition of the shareholder base. Trading and voting are complementary, which gives rise to self‐fulfilling expectations about proposal acceptance and multiple equilibria. Prices and shareholder welfare can move in opposite directions, so the former may be an invalid proxy ...
Levit, Doron+2 more
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The Effects of Human Resource Management Decisions on Shareholder Value [PDF]
We examine the effects of selected human resource management decisions on the abnormal change in total shareholder return. Announcements of human resource decisions are classified into five types--general HR system announcements, compensation and ...
Abowd, John M.+2 more
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Shareholder Conflicts and Dividends [PDF]
We examine how dividend policy is used to mitigate potential conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders in private Norwegian firms. The average payout is 50% higher if the majority shareholder’s equity stake is 55% (high conflict potential) rather than 95% (low conflict potential).
Berzins, Janis+2 more
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