Results 191 to 200 of about 3,181 (236)
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IDEOLOGY AND LEGISLATOR SHIRKING
Economic Inquiry, 1987We argue that legislator shirking (voting on the basis of personal ideology rather than the interests of one's constituents) can exist, but its appearance should conform to the law of demand. We test and confirm this theory using votes on defense expenditure bills in the U.S. Senate in 1982.
DOUGLAS NELSON, EUGENE SILBERBERG
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European Economic Review, 1993
Abstract Standard economics assumes that rational agents shirk, and that they have to be disciplined by monitoring and regulating. However, under specific circumstances regulating systematically worsens workers' morale and thereby negatively affects their behavior. When a principal attributes a lower work morale to the agents than they actually have,
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Abstract Standard economics assumes that rational agents shirk, and that they have to be disciplined by monitoring and regulating. However, under specific circumstances regulating systematically worsens workers' morale and thereby negatively affects their behavior. When a principal attributes a lower work morale to the agents than they actually have,
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018
This paper studies the effect of housing wealth shocks on workplace shirking behavior. We use the type and actual time stamps of 10.6 million credit card transactions by over 200,000 cardholders from a large commercial bank to detect non-work-related behavior during work hours. After positive shocks to house prices, employed homeowners in the treatment
Quanlin Gu, Jia He, Wenlan Qian
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This paper studies the effect of housing wealth shocks on workplace shirking behavior. We use the type and actual time stamps of 10.6 million credit card transactions by over 200,000 cardholders from a large commercial bank to detect non-work-related behavior during work hours. After positive shocks to house prices, employed homeowners in the treatment
Quanlin Gu, Jia He, Wenlan Qian
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A Simple Test of the Shirking Model [PDF]
Although popular in some circles, efficiency wage models of the labour market have proved surprisingly difficult to test and direct evidence for the central tenets of the theory is rare to non-existent. In this paper we propose a simple test of the Shapiro-Stiglitz shirking model which is based on the following idea. In the traditional search model the
Alan Manning, Jonathan Thomas
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Absenteeism, Presenteeism, and Shirking [PDF]
We develop the Barmby et al. (1993) model of absenteeism (which appeared in the Scandanavian Journal of Economics) to illustrate the potential for individuals to engage in ?presenteeism? viz. attending work even when they are entitled to paid absence.
S Brown, J G Sessions
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Responsibility Shirking in the EU
2023Abstract This chapter defines the failure of EU member states to comply with the duty to act in solidarity as ‘responsibility shirking’. More specifically, it asks: what does it mean to breach the duty to act in solidarity? And in what ways do EU member states currently breach this duty?
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Tunisia: Shirking in the Revolution
2023Abstract This chapter examines the Tunisian military’s behavior during the 2011 Arab Spring revolution that toppled President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. It disputes the conventional narrative that the military defected from Ben Ali, noting that the military was never ordered to repress protesters and thus it did not refuse.
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Working, Shirking, and Sabotage
Public Administration Review, 2000Books reviewed:John Brehm and Scott Gates, Working, Shirking, and Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response to a Democratic Public.
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Optimal Contracts with Shirking
The Review of Economic Studies, 2012I explicitly derive the optimal dynamic incentive contract in a standard continuoustime agency setting where the agent has a shirking action. My solution generates two dynamic contracts new to the literature. Both contracts include phases when the agent frequently shirks.
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