Results 241 to 250 of about 54,894 (295)
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Ideology, “shirking”, and representation
Public Choice, 1993In theory, republican government arises from the fact that the citizens are too numerous to be gathered in one place to make decisions. From the larger number a smaller number must be chosen and given the power to make decisions. How the small number should decide is the question of representation, and this question has been a central concern of public
Keith T. Poole, Thomas Romer
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Political Research Quarterly, 2007
While Lawrence's analysis highlights the importance of considering outliers, it neither disconfirms the original Rothenberg and Sanders analysis of shirking on the impeachment vote nor findings of shirking generally. Indeed, when a systematic analysis of outliers is conducted for Republican voting on the Clinton impeachment, shirking results again ...
Lawrence S. Rothenberg, Mitchell Sanders
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While Lawrence's analysis highlights the importance of considering outliers, it neither disconfirms the original Rothenberg and Sanders analysis of shirking on the impeachment vote nor findings of shirking generally. Indeed, when a systematic analysis of outliers is conducted for Republican voting on the Clinton impeachment, shirking results again ...
Lawrence S. Rothenberg, Mitchell Sanders
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Absenteeism, Efficiency Wages and Shirking
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1994We investigate the absence behaviour of workers when there is asymmetric information regarding worker health. An individual's health is assumed to be private information to that individual and only observable to a third party at cost. Our aim is to complement the existing, largely empirical, studies of absence behaviour, which have tended to treat the ...
Barmby T, Sessions J, Treble J
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Financing Capacity with Stealing and Shirking
Management Science, 2019We study a firm’s capacity choice under demand uncertainty given that it must finance this investment externally. Sharing profits with investors causes governance problems affecting both capacity and demand: the firm may “steal” capital, which reduces effective capacity, and “shirk” on market development, which reduces demand.
Francis de Véricourt, Denis Gromb
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FORE! An Analysis of CEO Shirking
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014Using golf play as a measure of leisure, we provide direct evidence that some CEOs shirk their responsibilities to the detriment of firm shareholders. CEOs with lower equity-based incentives play more golf and those that golf the most are associated with firms that have lower operating performance and firm values.
Lee Biggerstaff +2 more
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Over 10% of US employees now regularly work from home (WFH), but there is widespread skepticism over its impact highlighted by phrases like "shirking from home". We report the results of a WFH experiment at Ctrip, a 13,000 employee NASDAQ listed Chinese multinational. Call center employees who volunteered to WFH were randomly assigned to work from home
Nicholas Bloom +3 more
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Depolicing as Dissent Shirking
Criminal Justice Review, 2017Theory suggests that bureaucratic actors express opposition to unfavorable organizational and policy changes by acting in ways inconsistent with established rules, norms, and community expectations . Empirical evidence from various professional contexts and geographic locations lends support to the notion that some public employees have indeed engaged
Joshua Chanin, Brittany Sheats
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Ideology, voting, and shirking
Public Choice, 1993Since we first raised the issue in 1979, scholars have addressed two questions regarding ideology and congressional voting. Does ideology have an impact on such voting? Do representa- tives shirk by voting their own ideology rather than their constituents' interests?
James B. Kau, Paul H. Rubin
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IDEOLOGY AND LEGISLATOR SHIRKING
Economic Inquiry, 1987We argue that legislator shirking (voting on the basis of personal ideology rather than the interests of one's constituents) can exist, but its appearance should conform to the law of demand. We test and confirm this theory using votes on defense expenditure bills in the U.S. Senate in 1982.
DOUGLAS NELSON, EUGENE SILBERBERG
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