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2008 Bio-inspired, Learning and Intelligent Systems for Security, 2008
Conventional side-channel attacks which exploit the dynamic power consumption of CMOS devices to extract secret information from cryptographic devices are well established. The presence of an additional side channel utilising scattered electromagnetic emissions has previously been suggested, though a practical demonstration of the effect on ...
Andrew Burnside +2 more
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Conventional side-channel attacks which exploit the dynamic power consumption of CMOS devices to extract secret information from cryptographic devices are well established. The presence of an additional side channel utilising scattered electromagnetic emissions has previously been suggested, though a practical demonstration of the effect on ...
Andrew Burnside +2 more
openaire +1 more source
Side-Channel Analysis of Keymill
2017One prominent countermeasure against side-channel attacks, especially differential power analysis (DPA), is fresh re-keying. In such schemes, the so-called re-keying function takes the burden of protecting a cryptographic primitive against DPA. To ensure the security of the scheme against side-channel analysis, the re-keying function has to withstand ...
Christoph Dobraunig +3 more
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Thwarting side-channel attacks
Communications of the ACM, 2020Deep learning challenges chip security.
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Side channels as building blocks
Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, 2012Since the introduction of the first side-channel analyses in academia about 15 years ago, several physical attacks have been presented that exploit side-channel leakages to break implementations of cryptographic algorithms. This article deals with the same physical property of electronic devices, but focuses on the art of tailoring it for constructive ...
Markus Kasper +6 more
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2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2018
The first keylogging side channel attack was discovered over 50 years ago when Bell Laboratory researchers noticed an electromagnetic spike emanating from a Bell 131-B2 teletype terminal. This spike, emitted upon each key press, enabled up to 75% of plaintext communications to be recovered in field conditions.
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The first keylogging side channel attack was discovered over 50 years ago when Bell Laboratory researchers noticed an electromagnetic spike emanating from a Bell 131-B2 teletype terminal. This spike, emitted upon each key press, enabled up to 75% of plaintext communications to be recovered in field conditions.
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2011
The literature about side-channel attacks is very rich. Many side-channel distinguishers have been devised and studied; in the meantime, many different side-channels have been identified. Also, it has been underlined that the various samples garnered during the same acquisition can carry complementary information.
M. Abdelaziz Elaabid +3 more
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The literature about side-channel attacks is very rich. Many side-channel distinguishers have been devised and studied; in the meantime, many different side-channels have been identified. Also, it has been underlined that the various samples garnered during the same acquisition can carry complementary information.
M. Abdelaziz Elaabid +3 more
openaire +1 more source
Use of Simulators for Side-Channel Analysis
2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW), 2017Side-channel attacks are among the most powerful and cost-effective attacks on cryptographic systems. Simulators that are developed for side-channel analysis are very useful for preliminary analysis of new schemes, in depth analysis of existing schemes as well as for analysis of products on early stages of development. The contribution of this paper is
Nikita Veshchikov, Sylvain Guilley
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Exploiting the Difference of Side-Channel Leakages
2012In this paper, we propose a setup that improves the performance of implementation attacks by exploiting the difference of side-channel leakages. The main idea of our setup is to use two cryptographic devices and to measure the difference of their physical leakages, e.g., their power consumption.
Hutter M. +4 more
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Side Channel Cryptanalysis of Streebog
2015Streebog is the cryptographic hash function standard of the Russian Federation. It comprises two hash functions corresponding to two digest sizes, 256 bits and 512 bits. This paper presents a side channel attack that uses processor flag information to speed up message recovery by a factor of 2.
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Leakage Bounds for Gaussian Side Channels
2018In recent years, many leakage-resilient schemes have been published. These schemes guarantee security against side-channel attacks given bounded leakage of the underlying primitive. However, it is a challenging task to reliably determine these leakage bounds from physical properties.
Thomas Unterluggauer +6 more
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