Results 101 to 110 of about 667 (161)

Provincializing Frankfurt: A Postcolonial Rereading of Habermasian Theory

open access: yes
Constellations, Volume 33, Issue 1, Page 14-24, March 2026.
Floris Biskamp
wiley   +1 more source

Certainties and the Bedrock of Moral Reasoning: Three Ways the Spade Turns

open access: yesAnalytic Philosophy, Volume 67, Issue 1, Page 12-24, March 2026.
ABSTRACT In this paper, we identify and explain three kinds of bedrock in moral thought. The term “bedrock,” as introduced by Wittgenstein in §217 of the Philosophical Investigations, stands for the end of a chain of reasoning. We affirm that some chains of moral reasoning do indeed end with certainty.
Konstantin Deininger, Herwig Grimm
wiley   +1 more source

Spiritual intelligence: a scoping review on the gateway to mental health. [PDF]

open access: yesGlob Health Action
Pinto CT, Guedes L, Pinto S, Nunes R.
europepmc   +1 more source

A Modest Conception of Moral Right & Wrong

open access: yesAnalytic Philosophy, Volume 67, Issue 1, Page 72-82, March 2026.
ABSTRACT Taking inspiration from Hume, I advance a conception of the part of morality concerned with right and wrong, rooted in the actual moral rules established and followed within our society. Elsewhere, I have argued this approach provides a way of thinking about how we are genuinely “bound in a moral way” to keep our moral obligations that it is ...
Jorah Dannenberg
wiley   +1 more source

On the Practical Necessity of the Categories

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 112, Issue 2, Page 358-369, March 2026.
ABSTRACT Kant tells us that we cannot know whether all finite rational beings must share the same forms of sensibility. Can we know whether all finite rational beings must share the same forms of understanding? Recent discussion of this issue has focused on whether Kant thinks this can be decided from the theoretical point of view.
Anil Gomes, Andrew Stephenson
wiley   +1 more source

No puzzles about truth for nonrealist cognitivism

open access: yesThe Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 64, Issue 1, Page 38-54, March 2026.
Abstract Derek Parfit defended a metaethical theory which he calls nonrealist cognitivism. According to this theory, there are irreducibly normative truths that stand without ontological implications. A lot of literature has been dedicated to raising puzzles about the coherency of such a theory. The aim of this article is to solve a puzzle specifically
Evan Jack, Mustafa Khuramy
wiley   +1 more source

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