Results 171 to 180 of about 79,020 (206)
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Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences
Journal of Economic Theory, 2002Hans Peters, Ton Storcken
exaly +2 more sources
Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences
Social Choice and Welfare, 2022In a one-commodity economy with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments, we study different ways in which reallocation rules can be strategically distorted by affecting the set of active agents.
Agustín G. Bonifacio
semanticscholar +1 more source
Optimality of the uniform rule under single-peaked preferences
Economic Theory Bulletin, 2018Ruben Juarez, Juarez Ruben
exaly +2 more sources
Matching with single-peaked preferences
Journal of Economics Theory, 2019The crawler is a new efficient, strategyproof, and individually rational mechanism for housing markets with single-peaked preferences. In a housing market each agent is endowed with exactly one house. These houses are ordered – by their size for example –
Sophie Bade
semanticscholar +1 more source
Recognizing Single-Peaked Preferences on an Arbitrary Graph: Complexity and Algorithms
Algorithmic Game Theory, 2020This paper is devoted to a study of single-peakedness on arbitrary graphs. Given a collection of preferences (rankings of a set of alternatives), we aim at determining a connected graph G on which the preferences are single-peaked, in the sense that all ...
B. Escoffier +2 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Bandits with Single-Peaked Preferences and Limited Resources
arXiv.orgWe study an online stochastic matching problem in which an algorithm sequentially matches $U$ users to $K$ arms, aiming to maximize cumulative reward over $T$ rounds under budget constraints. Without structural assumptions, computing the optimal matching
Gur Keinan, Rotem Torkan, Omer Ben-Porat
semanticscholar +1 more source
Optimal Budget Aggregation with Single-Peaked Preferences
ACM Conference on Economics and ComputationWe study the problem of aggregating distributions, such as budget proposals, into a collective distribution. An ideal aggregation mechanism would be Pareto efficient, strategyproof, and fair.
Felix Brandt +3 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Bloc Voting on Single Peaked Preferences
arXiv.orgWe analyze the winning coalitions that arise under Bloc voting when voters preferences are single-peaked. For small numbers of candidates and numbers of winners, we determine conditions under which candidates in winning coalitions are adjacent.
A. Calver +3 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler
International Journal of Game Theory, 2022Y. Tamura
semanticscholar +1 more source
Strategy-proof and fair reallocation with single-peaked preferences
Social Choice and Welfare, 2021Zhen Zhao, Shinji Ohseto
semanticscholar +1 more source