Results 31 to 40 of about 12,042 (183)
Improving Man-Optimal Stable Matchings by Minimum Change of Preference Lists
In the stable marriage problem, any instance admits the so-called man-optimal stable matching, in which every man is assigned the best possible partner.
Shuichi Miyazaki +4 more
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Approximation algorithms for hard variants of the stable marriage and hospitals/residents problems [PDF]
When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in the Stable Marriage and Hospitals/Residents problems, stable matchings can have different sizes.
Irving, R.W. +3 more
core +1 more source
Randomized approximation of the stable marriage problem
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Magnús M. Halldórsson +3 more
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Linear Time Local Approximation Algorithm for Maximum Stable Marriage
We consider a two-sided market under incomplete preference lists with ties, where the goal is to find a maximum size stable matching. The problem is APX-hard, and a 3/2-approximation was given by McDermid [1]. This algorithm has a non-linear running time,
Zoltán Király
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A critical part of Automated Material Handling Systems (AMHS) is the task allocation and dispatching strategy employed. In order to better understand and investigate this component, we here present an extensive experimental evaluation of three different ...
Fabian Maas genannt Bermpohl +2 more
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Finding large stable matchings [PDF]
When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in the stable marriage and hospitals/residents problems, stable matchings can have different sizes.
Irving, R.W., Manlove, D.F.
core +1 more source
Popular Matchings in the Stable Marriage Problem
We consider the problem of computing a maximum cardinality popular matching in a bipartite graph G=(A@?B,E) where each vertex u@?A@?B ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference. Such a graph is called an instance of the stable marriage problem with strict preferences and incomplete lists. A matching M^@? is popular if for every matching M in G,
Chien-Chung Huang 0001 +1 more
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An Equitable Solution to the Stable Marriage Problem [PDF]
A stable marriage problem (SMP) of size n involves n men and n women, each of whom has ordered members of the opposite gender by descending preferability. A solution is a perfect matching among men and women, such that there exists no pair who prefer each other to their current spouses. The problem was formulated in 1962 by Gale and Shapley, who showed
Ioannis Giannakopoulos +4 more
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A Note on the Uniqueness of Stable Marriage Matching
In this note we present some sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of a stable matching in the Gale-Shapley marriage classical model of even size. We also state the result on the existence of exactly two stable matchings in the marriage problem of odd
Drgas-Burchardt Ewa
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Instability in Stable Marriage Problem: Matching Unequally Numbered Men and Women
The goal of the stable marriage problem is to match by pair two sets composed by the same number of elements. Due to its widespread applications in the real world, especially the unique importance to the centralized matchmaker, a very large number of ...
Gui-Yuan Shi +4 more
doaj +1 more source

