Results 81 to 90 of about 12,042 (183)
Strategic play in stable marriage problem
CoRR, 2016 89 pages, 8 sections. Main result in Section 3.
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Farsighted Collusion in Stable Marriage Problem
CoRR, 2019 The Stable Marriage Problem, as proposed by Gale and Shapley, considers producing a bipartite matching between two equally sized sets of boys (proposers) and respectively girls (acceptors), each member having a total preference order over the other set, such that the outcome is stable. In this paper we consider the Game directly induced by this problem
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An n-ary Constraint for the Stable Marriage Problem
CoRR, 2013 We present an n-ary constraint for the stable marriage problem. This constraint acts between two sets of integer variables where the domains of those variables represent preferences. Our constraint enforces stability and disallows bigamy. For a stable marriage instance with $n$ men and $n$ women we require only one of these constraints, and the ...
Chris Unsworth, Patrick Prosser
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Abstract argumentation and (optimal) stable marriage problems
Argument & Computation, 2019 In his pioneering work on Abstract Argumentation, P.M. Dung set a wide scenario by connecting stable models in Logic and Game Theory to simple Abstract Argumentation Frameworks ( AAF), which are essentially directed graphs in which arguments are represented as nodes, and the attack relation is represented by arrows. From such abstraction and simplicity,
Stefano Bistarelli, Francesco Santini
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Compact Preference Representation in Stable Marriage Problems [PDF]
, 2009 The stable marriage problem has many practical applications in two-sided markets like those that assign doctors to hospitals, students to schools, or buyers to vendors. Most algorithms to find stable marriages assume that the participants explicitly expresses a preference ordering.
PILOTTO E +3 more
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The unsplittable stable marriage problem [PDF]
, 2012 The Gale-Shapley "propose/reject" algorithm is a wellknown procedure for solving the classical stable marriage problem. In this paper we study this algorithm in the context of the many-to-many stable marriage problem, also known as the stable allocation ...
Dean, Brian C. +2 more
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The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) [PDF]
In this note we extend Jackson and WattsJET2002''s result on the coincidence of S-stochastically stable and core stable networks from the marriage problem to the solvable roommate problem.
Klijn, Flip +2 more
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The Stable Marriage Problem [PDF]
, 1970 The original work of Gale and Shapley on an assignment method using the stable marriage criterion has been extended to find all the stable marriage assignments.
Wilson LB, McVitie DG
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Theorien der ehelichen Instabilität
Journal of Family Research, 1990 In this article the current State of research in instability of marriage and divorce is tried to be outlined. Besides the functionalistic Interpretation of the problem the contributions of the Exchange Theory and the Economic Theory of the family ...
Paul B. Hill, Johannes Kopp
doaj
On the Equivalence of G-weak and -strong Cores in the Marriage Problem [PDF]
In the marriage problem (two-sided one-to-one matching problem), it is well-known that the weak core, the strong core and the set of stable matchings are all equivalent.
Koji Takamiya
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