Results 11 to 20 of about 11,758 (226)
Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership [PDF]
We consider a linear quantity setting duopoly game and analyzewhich of the players will commit when both players have the possibility todo so. To that end, we study a 2-stage game in which each player caneither commit to a quantity in stage 1 or wait till stage 2.
van Damme, E.E.C., Hurkens, S.
core +14 more sources
In Stackelberg planning, a leader and a follower each choose a plan in the same planning task, the leader's objective being to maximize plan cost for the follower. This formulation naturally captures, among others, security-related scenarios where the leader defends an infrastructure against subsequent attacks by the follower.
Philipp Sauer +3 more
core +3 more sources
Unraveling the symmetry of Al5C3N [PDF]
From experimental and theoretical techniques employed in this thorough reexamination of the structure of Al5C3N, the crystal structure is better described in centrosymmetric space group P63/mmc (No. 194) rather than in the previously reported noncentrosymmetric space group P63mc (No. 186).High‐temperature ceramic compound Al5C3N belongs to the scarcely
Vitalii Shtender +8 more
wiley +2 more sources
A Bayesian Stackelberg Game Approach to Remote State Estimation Under SINR-Based DoS Attacks with Incomplete Information [PDF]
With limited energy constraints, the issue of transmission and interference strategies have received considerable critical attention in cyber–physical security.
Di Deng, Peng Yi, Mingze Qi
doaj +2 more sources
Stackelberg games feature strategic interactions among rational agents in markets on which some hierarchical competition takes place. In this chapter we present three prototypes of deterministic noncooperative Stackelberg games with increasing level of generality. The first is the basic duopoly game. The second is the oligopoly multiple leader-follower
Julien, Ludovic A.
core +5 more sources
Abstract We propose a hierarchical energy management scheme for aggregating Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) for grid flexibility services. To prevent a direct participation of numerous prosumers in the wholesale electricity market, aggregators, as self‐interest agents in our scheme, incentivize prosumers to provide flexibility. We firstly model the
Xiupeng Chen +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Abstract This paper provides a systematic study of the robust Stackelberg equilibrium (RSE), which naturally extends the widely adopted solution concept of the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE).
Jiarui Gan +3 more
openaire +2 more sources
Stackelberg Independence* [PDF]
The standard model of sequential capacity choices is the Stackelberg quantity leadership model with linear demand. I show that under the standard assumptions, leaders’ actions are informative about market conditions and independent of leaders’ beliefs about the arrivals of followers.
openaire +4 more sources
On Stackelberg mixed strategies [PDF]
It is sometimes the case that one solution concept in game theory is equivalent to applying another solution concept to a modified version of the game. In such cases, does it make sense to study the former separately (as it applies to the original representation of the game), or should we entirely subordinate it to the latter?
openaire +2 more sources
Multiscale control of Stackelberg games
We present a linear--quadratic Stackelberg game with a large number of followers and we also derive the mean field limit of infinitely many followers. The relation between optimization and mean-field limit is studied and conditions for consistency are established.
Michael Herty +2 more
openaire +2 more sources

