Results 1 to 10 of about 1,987 (214)
Do Followers Really Matter in Stackelberg Competition? [PDF]
Do Followers Really Matter in Stackelberg Competition? Abstract: In this paper, we consider a T-stage linear model of Stackelberg oligopoly. First, we show geometrically and analytically that under the two conditions of linear market demand and ...
Ludovic Julien +2 more
doaj +7 more sources
Stackelberg and Cournot competition under equilibrium limit pricing [PDF]
Proposes a model which shows that Stackelberg competition is not necessarily welfare‐ enhancing compared with Cournot competition. Shows that, although in a simple duopoly model prices in a Stackelberg equilibrium are lower than in a Cournot equilibrium, this is not necessarily true in an entry‐deterrence framework, where post‐entry competition is ...
Marco A Haan
exaly +4 more sources
Technology Sharing and Competitiveness in a Stackelberg Model [PDF]
The existing literature has made great achievements in technology sharing (licensing patents) contracts, which has defects in the selection of oligopoly models, the setting of innovation subjects, the consideration of product heterogeneity, and ...
Junlong Chen +3 more
doaj +2 more sources
Social Responsibility Decision-Making of Universities in Stackelberg Competition [PDF]
This paper establishes a Stackelberg competition model of two universities considering social responsibility (SR) and market sensitivity (MS) and examines the equilibrium results of four different scenarios: only the leader implements SR; only the ...
Xiaolei Wang, Chaoqun Sun, Jiali Liu
doaj +3 more sources
Strategic delegation effects on Cournot and Stackelberg competition
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Nickolas J Michelacakis
exaly +4 more sources
Stackelberg-Nash Equilibrium and Perfect Competition in the Solow-Uzawa Growth Model
This study introduces Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium to neoclassical growth theory. It attempts to make neoclassical economic growth theory more robust in modelling the complexity of market structures.
Wei-Bin Zhang
doaj +1 more source
Abstract We propose a hierarchical energy management scheme for aggregating Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) for grid flexibility services. To prevent a direct participation of numerous prosumers in the wholesale electricity market, aggregators, as self‐interest agents in our scheme, incentivize prosumers to provide flexibility. We firstly model the
Xiupeng Chen +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Competitive Behavior of Developers' Development Scale in the Assembled Construction Market: An Analysis Based on Game Theory [PDF]
The paper constructs the oligopoly models of assembled building developers based on Cournot model and Stackelberg model of development scale competition. Based on the comparison of the profit of the regional assembled building market, which is obvious in
Luo Gangqiang, Wang Qin
doaj +1 more source
Competition on many fronts: A stackelberg signaling equilibrium [PDF]
A single economic agent controls a variety of activities. Each activity is associated with a privately observed piece of information. The information is relevant to the actions he will take in this activity, and to the vulnerability of this activity to attack by another agent. Actions should be chosen so as partially to hide the private information, as
Green, Jerry, Laffont, Jean-Jacques
openaire +4 more sources
Stackelberg Social Equilibrium in Water Markets
Market power in water markets can be modeled as simultaneous quantity competition on a river structure and analyzed by applying social equilibrium. In an example of a duopoly water market, we argue that the lack of backward induction logic implies that ...
Harold Houba, Françeska Tomori
doaj +1 more source

