Results 11 to 20 of about 1,310 (176)
Equilibrium in a Stackelberg duopoly
Theoretical and Applied Economics, 2021 Theory of the games offers perfect tools for modelling imperfect competition specific processes, manifested in relation with product quantity (Cournot/Stackelberg type), product price (Bertrand type) or quality.
Ciprian RUSESCU
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Stackelberg Equilibrium of the Client and the Producer of Embedded Software [PDF]
Business Systems Research, 2014 Background: Our research assumes that the software quality affects the product validity. This assumption also refers to embedded software. Objectives: This paper analyses the Stackelberg equilibrium in which the consumer is the leader and the producer of
Vrankić Ilko +2 more
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International Journal of Robust and Nonlinear Control, EarlyView., 2023 Abstract We propose a hierarchical energy management scheme for aggregating Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) for grid flexibility services. To prevent a direct participation of numerous prosumers in the wholesale electricity market, aggregators, as self‐interest agents in our scheme, incentivize prosumers to provide flexibility. We firstly model the
Xiupeng Chen +3 more
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Computing Stackelberg Equilibrium with Memory in Sequential Games [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021 Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader's commitment. We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria in sequential games with finite and indefinite ...
Aditya Aradhye +2 more
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Entry, stackelberg equilibrium and reasonable conjectures [PDF]
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1988 We show that the consideration of Stackelberg equilibrium and reasonable conjecture equilibria (R.C.E.) provide some foundation to the concept of limit pricing.
Corchón, Luis C., Marcos, Félix
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A Dynamic Stackelberg–Cournot Duopoly Model with Heterogeneous Strategies through One-Way Spillovers
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2020 Many works studied on complex dynamics of Cournot or Stackelberg games, but few references discussed a dynamic game model combined with the Cournot game phase and Stackelberg game phase.
Jianjun Long, Hui Huang
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A Novel Joint Dataset and Incentive Management Mechanism for Federated Learning Over MEC
IEEE Access, 2022 In this study, to reduce the energy consumption for the federated learning (FL) participation of mobile devices (MDs), we design a novel joint dataset and incentive management mechanism for FL over mobile edge computing (MEC) systems.
Joohyung Lee, Daejin Kim, Dusit Niyato
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Competition on many fronts: A stackelberg signaling equilibrium [PDF]
Games and Economic Behavior, 1990 A single economic agent controls a variety of activities. Each activity is associated with a privately observed piece of information. The information is relevant to the actions he will take in this activity, and to the vulnerability of this activity to attack by another agent. Actions should be chosen so as partially to hide the private information, as
Green, Jerry, Laffont, Jean-Jacques
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Quasi-Perfect Stackelberg Equilibrium
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019 Equilibrium refinements are important in extensive-form (i.e., tree-form) games, where they amend weaknesses of the Nash equilibrium concept by requiring sequential rationality and other beneficial properties. One of the most attractive refinement concepts is quasi-perfect equilibrium.
Alberto Marchesi +4 more
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Competitive Behavior of Developers' Development Scale in the Assembled Construction Market: An Analysis Based on Game Theory [PDF]
E3S Web of Conferences, 2019 The paper constructs the oligopoly models of assembled building developers based on Cournot model and Stackelberg model of development scale competition. Based on the comparison of the profit of the regional assembled building market, which is obvious in
Luo Gangqiang, Wang Qin
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