Results 141 to 150 of about 2,295 (180)
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Theoretical Computer Science, 2019
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Toni Böhnlein +2 more
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Toni Böhnlein +2 more
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A Stackelberg order execution game
Annals of Operations Research, 2022zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Yinhong Dong +4 more
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Credibility in stackelberg games
Systems & Control Letters, 1984In a Stackelberg game, the leader can form incentives and raise threats upon followers to improve his own performance. The issue of credibility concerns whether the followers believe or not in the incentives and threats declared by the leader. In this paper, credibility is studied for two-person, single-stage games.
Luh, Peter B. +2 more
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2018
Stackelberg games feature strategic interactions among rational agents in markets on which some hierarchical competition takes place. In this chapter we present three prototypes of deterministic noncooperative Stackelberg games with increasing level of generality. The first is the basic duopoly game. The second is the oligopoly multiple leader-follower
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Stackelberg games feature strategic interactions among rational agents in markets on which some hierarchical competition takes place. In this chapter we present three prototypes of deterministic noncooperative Stackelberg games with increasing level of generality. The first is the basic duopoly game. The second is the oligopoly multiple leader-follower
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Mitigating uncertainty in Stackelberg games
2012 IEEE 51st IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2012We present robust Stackelberg games with two types of players: leaders who have side information and can identify the actions of other players, and followers who do not have such information. In such games, a leader chooses its actions based on its side information, and a follower chooses its actions myopically based on its observations.
Saeedeh Parsaeefard +2 more
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Stackelberg Game on the Boundary of Coexistence
2011 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), 2011This paper combines Convex analysis and Game theory to investigate the problem of maximizing the sum rate of transceivers operating in the same frequency band. In our earlier work [1], we proved that for transceivers operating under a total power constraint, the power distribution that maximizes the sum rate lies on the boundary of the feasible set ...
Kandasamy Illanko +2 more
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Stackelberg Games for Vaccine Design
International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2015Stackelberg game models have recently seen considerable practical and academic success in security applications, with defender as the leader, and attacker the follower. The key conceptual insight of Stackelberg security games is that defense needs to be proactive, optimally accounting for attacker's response to a defensive posture. We propose that this
Swetasudha Panda, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
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Signaling in Bayesian Stackelberg Games
International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2016Algorithms for solving Stackelberg games are used in an ever-growing variety of real-world domains. Previous work has extended this framework to allow the leader to commit not only to a distribution over actions, but also to a scheme for stochastically signaling information about these actions to the follower.
Haifeng Xu +4 more
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Cournot–Stackelberg games in competitive delocation
Annals of Operations Research, 2016zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Diego Ruiz-Hernández +2 more
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2021
In this chapter, we give an introduction to several game-theoretic solution concepts that will be used in this book. The chapter starts by introducing matrix-form strategic games and the concept of Nash equilibrium. We then present extensive-form games and the concept of information sets. Stackelberg games are an important type of extensive-form games.
Jeffrey Pawlick, Quanyan Zhu
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In this chapter, we give an introduction to several game-theoretic solution concepts that will be used in this book. The chapter starts by introducing matrix-form strategic games and the concept of Nash equilibrium. We then present extensive-form games and the concept of information sets. Stackelberg games are an important type of extensive-form games.
Jeffrey Pawlick, Quanyan Zhu
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