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Stackelberg Games for Vaccine Design
International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2015Stackelberg game models have recently seen considerable practical and academic success in security applications, with defender as the leader, and attacker the follower. The key conceptual insight of Stackelberg security games is that defense needs to be proactive, optimally accounting for attacker's response to a defensive posture. We propose that this
Swetasudha Panda, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
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Signaling in Bayesian Stackelberg Games
International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2016Algorithms for solving Stackelberg games are used in an ever-growing variety of real-world domains. Previous work has extended this framework to allow the leader to commit not only to a distribution over actions, but also to a scheme for stochastically signaling information about these actions to the follower.
Haifeng Xu +4 more
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Cournot–Stackelberg games in competitive delocation
Annals of Operations Research, 2016zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Diego Ruiz-Hernández +2 more
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2021
In this chapter, we give an introduction to several game-theoretic solution concepts that will be used in this book. The chapter starts by introducing matrix-form strategic games and the concept of Nash equilibrium. We then present extensive-form games and the concept of information sets. Stackelberg games are an important type of extensive-form games.
Jeffrey Pawlick, Quanyan Zhu
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In this chapter, we give an introduction to several game-theoretic solution concepts that will be used in this book. The chapter starts by introducing matrix-form strategic games and the concept of Nash equilibrium. We then present extensive-form games and the concept of information sets. Stackelberg games are an important type of extensive-form games.
Jeffrey Pawlick, Quanyan Zhu
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2008 Chinese Control and Decision Conference, 2008
Nash game and Stackelberg one are two basic games in game theory community. It is extremely important to further investigate them. Here we show that the leaders will benefit from the interactions in a game. The organization structure in economics is considered with game theory techniques.
null Pu-yan Nie, null Pei-ai Zhang
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Nash game and Stackelberg one are two basic games in game theory community. It is extremely important to further investigate them. Here we show that the leaders will benefit from the interactions in a game. The organization structure in economics is considered with game theory techniques.
null Pu-yan Nie, null Pei-ai Zhang
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A Stackelberg knapsack game with weight control
Theoretical Computer Science, 2019zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Ulrich Pferschy +2 more
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Stackelberg Strategies for Atomic Congestion Games
Theory of Computing Systems, 2007zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Adversarial Deep Learning with Stackelberg Games
2019Deep networks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks from malicious adversaries. Currently, many adversarial learning algorithms are designed to exploit such vulnerabilities in deep networks. These methods focus on attacking and retraining deep networks with adversarial examples to do either feature manipulation or label manipulation or both.
Aneesh Sreevallabh Chivukula +2 more
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Stackelberg Differential Games
2018In Stackelberg games, the players are not on an equal footing. There is a leader and a follower. This is a generalization of the two-player zero-sum differential games considered in Section 16.4, in particular.
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Policy diffusion in a simple Stackelberg game [PDF]
, 2010 Strategic environmental policy games are usually based on simultaneous decision making and reach the conclusion that the policy choices are strategic substitutes. Empirical evidence, however, shows that the introduction of a regulatory instrument usually follows a consecutive pattern that is best described as policy diffusion.
Peter Michaelis, Thomas Ziesemer
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