Results 251 to 260 of about 142,017 (307)

Active guidance in ultrasound bladder scanning using reinforcement learning. [PDF]

open access: yesSci Rep
Hsu HL   +9 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Optimal Subjective Contracting with Revision

Management Science, 2022
We study the optimal contracting problem with subjective evaluation when the principal can ask the agent to revise his work. The possibility of revision benefits the principal by providing the option value of making another attempt at the work. However, it also introduces a new type of incentive problem for the principal: she may ask for revision even
Xinhao He, Jin Li 0037, Zhaoneng Yuan
openaire   +1 more source

Subject of a civil contract

Law and innovations, 2020
Problem statement. Due to the market transformations that have occurred recently in the economy of Ukraine, the opportunities of participants in property turnover regarding the freedom to conclude various types of contracts have significantly expanded.
openaire   +1 more source

Subjective Beliefs about Contract Enforceability

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021
This paper assesses the content, role, and adaptability of subjective beliefs about contract enforceability in the context of postemployment covenants not to compete (“noncompetes”). We show that employees of all stripes tend to believe that their noncompetes are enforceable, even when they are not.
Prescott, J.J., Starr, Evan P.
openaire   +1 more source

The Subject-Experimenter Contract: A Reexamination of Subject Pool Contamination

Teaching of Psychology, 1990
We conducted three experiments to investigate: (a) the extent to which student research participants believe they will disclose details of their experiences, (b) how much subjects actually will disclose immediately following a request not to reveal information, and (c) how much they will disclose after a 2-week interval.
Kitty Klein, Brian Cheuvront
openaire   +1 more source

Objective and Subjective Indicators in Long-term Contracting

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018
We study the optimal compensation contract in a dynamic moral hazard setting with limited liability and two stages of production. At the end of the first stage, both an objective signal (publicly observed) and a subjective signal (privately observed by the principal) realize, and they are informative of the second-stage productivity.
Pak Hung Au, Bin R. Chen
openaire   +2 more sources

Subjective and Electromyographic Assessment of Isometric Muscle Contractions

Ergonomics, 1970
Forty male subjects were asked to pull either 25 per cent or 50 per cent of their maximal voluntary contraction on an isometric dynamometer handle. During the pull they were asked to rate the pain experienced in the muscles on a five-point scale. During the task the active muscle was continuously monitored by recording the EMG.
A J, Lloyd, J H, Voor, T J, Thieman
openaire   +2 more sources

SUBJECTIVE EVALUATION IN AGENCY CONTRACTS*

The Japanese Economic Review, 2006
We study how a principal uses her subjective evaluation of the agent’s performance in an incentive contract. It is shown that the subjective evaluation can be used either 1) when there is no other information about the agent’s performance and the principal is able to discard money, or 2) when the principal chooses between wage payment based on ...
openaire   +1 more source

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