Results 111 to 120 of about 508 (154)
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American Political Science Review, 1996
Minimal winning coalitions have appeared as a key prediction or as an essential assumption of virtually all formal models of coalition formation, vote buying, and logrolling. Notwithstanding this research, we provide a model showing that supermajority coalitions may be cheaper than minimal winning coalitions.
Tim Groseclose, James M. Snyder
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Minimal winning coalitions have appeared as a key prediction or as an essential assumption of virtually all formal models of coalition formation, vote buying, and logrolling. Notwithstanding this research, we provide a model showing that supermajority coalitions may be cheaper than minimal winning coalitions.
Tim Groseclose, James M. Snyder
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Erkenntnis, 2015
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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The informational role of supermajorities
Journal of Public Economics, 2007We study a collective decision making environment where an agenda setter makes strategic proposals to privately informed voters who vote strategically. We show that, consistent with empirical evidence, it can be optimal for the agenda setter to propose supermajorities.
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Supermajority rule and the law of 1/n
Public Choice, 2015This paper investigates the impact of a supermajority rule on the law of 1/n, which posits that a larger number of districts increases the size of government. Our analysis suggests that supermajority rule, despite the claim that it restrains excessive spending, increases the 1/n effect, because qualified majorities require logrolling to attract ...
Dongwon Lee
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A note on the Condorcet Jury Theorem with supermajority voting rules [PDF]
Social Choice and Welfare, 2003 Mark Fey
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2004
The size of a supermajority required to change an existing contract varies widely in different settings. This paper analyzes the optimal supermajority requirement, determined by multilateral bargaining behind the veil of ignorance. The optimum is determined by a tradeoff between reducing hold-up power of small groups and reducing expropriation of ...
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The size of a supermajority required to change an existing contract varies widely in different settings. This paper analyzes the optimal supermajority requirement, determined by multilateral bargaining behind the veil of ignorance. The optimum is determined by a tradeoff between reducing hold-up power of small groups and reducing expropriation of ...
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The arbitrariness of supermajority rules
Social Science Information, 2010There may be good general grounds for the adoption of supermajoritarian thresholds, but no such general arguments can justify the selection of a specific threshold. Although the benefits of supermajority rules, especially in the context of constitutional-amendment procedures, may outweigh the costs of their ex ante indeterminacy, the technically ...
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Public Spending and the Paradox of Supermajority Rule
Southern Economic Journal, 2014This article examines the paradox that a supermajority rule in a legislature promotes excessive government spending. We propose a simple conjecture: If rent‐seeking coalitions dominate legislative politics and if individual legislators' demands for rent‐seeking activities are price‐inelastic, a change of legislative rules from simple majority to a ...
Dongwon Lee +2 more
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2004
The evidence is clear that the private sector can do just about anything more efficiently than the government. Municipal solid waste disposal costs 61% to 71% more when done by government.1 Another study found that contracting out waste collection to the private sector saved between 22% and 30%.2 It takes 68% more federal government employees to remove
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The evidence is clear that the private sector can do just about anything more efficiently than the government. Municipal solid waste disposal costs 61% to 71% more when done by government.1 Another study found that contracting out waste collection to the private sector saved between 22% and 30%.2 It takes 68% more federal government employees to remove
openaire +1 more source