Results 11 to 20 of about 88 (87)
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Talman, Dolf +2 more
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Supermodular games and potential games [PDF]
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2003 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
BRANZEI R., MALLOZZI, LINA, TIJS S.
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Scenario Sampling for Large Supermodular Games
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2023 This paper introduces a simulation algorithm for evaluating the log-likelihood function of a large supermodular binary-action game. Covered examples include (certain types of) peer effect, technology adoption, strategic network formation, and multi-market entry games.
Graham, Bryan S., Pelican, Andrin
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Stochastic approximation, cooperative dynamics and supermodular games [PDF]
The Annals of Applied Probability, 2012 This paper considers a stochastic approximation algorithm, with decreasing step size and martingale difference noise. Under very mild assumptions, we prove the non convergence of this process toward a certain class of repulsive sets for the associated ordinary differential equation (ODE). We then use this result to derive the convergence of the process
Benaim Michel, Faure Mathieu
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Robustness in binary-action supermodular games revisited
The Japanese Economic Review, 2023 AbstractWe show that in all (whether generic or nongeneric) binary-action supermodular games, an extreme action profile is robust to incomplete information if and only if it is a monotone potential maximizer. The equivalence does not hold for nonextreme action profiles.
Daisuke Oyama, Satoru Takahashi
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Implementation Via Information Design in Binary-Action Supermodular Games
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020 What outcomes can be implemented by the choice of an information structure in binary‐action supermodular games? An outcome is partially implementable if it satisfies obedience (Bergemann and Morris (2016)). We characterize when an outcome is smallest equilibrium implementable (induced by the smallest equilibrium).
Morris, Stephen +2 more
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Naval Research Logistics (NRL), EarlyView.ABSTRACT We are concerned with the stability of a transferable‐utility cooperative (TU) game. First, the concept of core can be weakened so that the blocking of changes is limited to only those with multilateral backings. This principle of consensual blocking, as well as the traditional core‐defining one of unilateral blocking and one straddling in ...
Jian Yang
wiley +1 more source
The RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT A platform matches a unit mass of sellers, each owning a single product of heterogeneous quality, to a unit mass of buyers with differing valuations for unit‐quality. After matching, sellers make take‐it‐or‐leave‐it price‐offers to buyers. Initially, valuations of buyers are only known to them and the platform, but sellers make inferences from
Daniele Condorelli, Balazs Szentes
wiley +1 more source
The Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We study optimal simple rating systems that partition sellers into a finite number of tiers. We show that optimal ratings must be threshold partitions, and that for linear supply and Cournot competition with constant marginal cost, optimal thresholds solve a k‐means clustering problem requiring only the quality distribution.
Hugo Hopenhayn, Maryam Saeedi
wiley +1 more source
Abstract Interpretation of Supermodular Games [PDF]
, 2016 Supermodular games find significant applications in a variety of models, especially in operations research and economic applications of noncooperative game theory, and feature pure strategy Nash equilibria characterized as fixed points of multivalued functions on complete lattices.
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