Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games
Theoretical Economics, 2019 This paper extends Milgrom and Robert's treatment of supermodular games in two ways. It points out that their main characterization result holds under a weaker assumption. It refines the arguments to provide bounds on the set of strategies that survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies.
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Supermodular Game for Power Control in TOA-Based Positioning
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 2013 In this paper, we address the problem of minimizing the energy cost of positioning nodes in a wireless sensor network, using time of arrival measurements. A sensor needs to receive at least three distance measurements to known anchors in order to position itself.
Moragrega, A, Closas, P, Ibars, C
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The supermodularity of the tax competition game
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2019 Tax competition is often associated with the “race to the bottom:” a decrease in the tax rate of one jurisdiction (country, region or municipality) triggers similar reactions in neighboring jurisdictions. This race can be related to two properties of the tax competition game: positive tax spillovers and the strategic complementarity of tax rates. Using
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Computations and Complexities of Tarski's Fixed Points and Supermodular Games
, 2020 We consider two models of computation for Tarski's order preserving function f related to fixed points in a complete lattice: the oracle function model and the polynomial function model. In both models, we find the first polynomial time algorithm for finding a Tarski's fixed point.
Dang, Chuangyin, Qi, Qi, Ye, Yinyu
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Equilibrium Selection under Different Learning Modes in Supermodular Games [PDF]
, 1999 We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed by recent evolutionaryliterature to the class of strict supermodular games when two simplebehavior rules coexist in the population, imitation and myopic optimization. We assume that myopic optimizers are able to see how well their payoff doesrelative to what they can get in the stage game and therefore
Oddvar M. Kaarboe, Alexander F. Tieman
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The optimal delivery time and order quantity in an oligopoly market with time-sensitive customers. [PDF]
PLoS One, 2019 Li H, Xu W, Yang K.
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Best reply structure and equilibrium convergence in generic games. [PDF]
Sci Adv, 2019 Pangallo M, Heinrich T, Doyne Farmer J.
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Managing Disease Risks from Trade: Strategic Behavior with Many Choices and Price Effects. [PDF]
Ecohealth, 2018 Chitchumnong P, Horan RD.
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The replicator equation and other game dynamics. [PDF]
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 2014 Cressman R, Tao Y.
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Distributed Power Allocation for Wireless Sensor Network Localization: A Potential Game Approach. [PDF]
Sensors (Basel), 2018 Ke M +5 more
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