Results 61 to 70 of about 88 (87)
Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games [PDF]
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Supermodularity and Supermodular Games
2010The concept of complementarity is well established in economics at least since Edgeworth (1881). The basic idea of complementarity is that the marginal value of an action increases with the level of other actions available. The mathematical concept of supermodularity formalizes the idea of complementarity. The theory of monotone comparative statics and
Steven N. Durlauf, Lawrence E. Blume
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Monotone equilibria in nonatomic supermodular games. A comment
Games and Economic Behavior, 2015zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Balbus, Łukasz +2 more
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Computing Least Cores of Supermodular Cooperative Games
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017One of the goals of a cooperative game is to compute a valuedivision to the players from which they have no incentive todeviate. This concept is formalized as the notion of the core.To obtain a value division that motivates players to cooperate to a greater extent or that is more robust under noise, the notions of the strong least core ...
Daisuke Hatano, Yuichi Yoshida
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Generalized Belief Operator and Robustness in Binary‐Action Supermodular Games
Econometrica, 2020This paper studies the robustness of an equilibrium to incomplete information in binary‐action supermodular games. Using a generalized version of belief operator, we explore the restrictions that prior beliefs impose on higher order beliefs. In particular, we obtain a nontrivial lower bound on the probability of a common belief event, uniform over type
Oyama, Daisuke, Takahashi, Satoru
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Estimating Supermodular Games Using Rationalizable Strategies
2013Abstract We propose a set-estimation approach to supermodular games using the restrictons of rationalizable strategies, which is a weaker solution concept than Nash equilibrium. The set of rationalizable strategies of a supermodular game forms a complete lattice, and are bounded above and below by two extremal Nash equilibria.
Uetake, Kosuke, Watanabe, Yasutora
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Submodularity and supermodularity in contest games
International Journal of Economic TheoryAbstractThis paper presents various examples of two‐player submodular or supermodular contest games. Emphasizing the three main elements of a contest model, our examples revolve around situations where (i) contest success function allows for a draw, (ii) winning prize is not exogenously given but rather jointly produced, or (iii) individual effort cost
Karagözoğlu, Emin +2 more
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Journal of Economic Theory, 2015
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Oyama Daisuke, Takahashi Satoru
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Oyama Daisuke, Takahashi Satoru
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Abstracting Nash equilibria of supermodular games
Formal Methods in System Design, 2017zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Symmetric versus asymmetric equilibria in symmetric supermodular games
International Journal of Game Theory, 2008zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Amir, Rabah +2 more
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