Results 1 to 10 of about 43,287 (98)
Learning in Perturbed Asymmetric Games [PDF]
We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2 person (bimatrix) games under perturbed best response dynamics. A mixed equilibrium is asymptotically stable under all such dynamics if and only if the game is linearly equivalent to a zero ...
Hofbauer, Josef, Hopkins, Ed
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Improving Efficiency and Equality in School Choice [PDF]
How should students be assigned to schools? Two mechanisms have been suggested and implemented around the world: deferred acceptance (DA) and top trading cycles (TTC).
Klein, Thilo, Ortega, Josue
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Utilitarianism with and without expected utility [PDF]
We give two social aggregation theorems under conditions of risk, one for constant population cases, the other an extension to variable populations. Intra and interpersonal welfare comparisons are encoded in a single ‘individual preorder’.
McCarthy, David +2 more
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Breaking and sustaining bifurcations in SN-Invariant equidistant economy [PDF]
This paper elucidates the bifurcation mechanism of an equidistant economy in spatial economics. To this end, we derive the rules of secondary and further bifurcations as a major theoretical contribution of this paper.
Aizawa, H. +3 more
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Unique Equilibria in Models of Rational Asset Price Bubbles
Existing models of rational pure bubble models feature multiple (and often a continuum of) equilibria, which makes model predictions and policy analysis non-robust.
Hirano, Tomohiro, Toda, Alexis Akira
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This paper presents a model with the aim to follow, as closely as possible, the rationale of the macroeconomic model advanced by J.M. Keynes in his famous "The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money", in order to provide a viable tool for ...
Biondo, Alessio Emanuele
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Efficient Communication in Organizations
Organizations design their communication structures to improve decision-making while limiting wasteful influence activities. An efficient communication protocol grants complete-information payoffs to all organization members, thereby overcoming ...
Vaccari, Federico
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Mutual knowledge of rationality and correct beliefs in $n$-person games: An impossibility theorem
There are two well-known sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium: common knowledge of rationality, and common prior, which exogenously assumes a profile of beliefs that are correct. However, it is not known how players arrive at a common prior \textit{
Ismail, Mehmet S.
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We revisit Popper's falsifiability criterion. A tester hires a potential expert to produce a theory, offering payments contingent on the observed performance of the theory.
Whitmeyer, Mark, Zhang, Kun
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On the unimportance of commitment for monetary policy
In a New Keynesian model where the trade-off between stabilising the aggregate inflation rate and the output gap arises from sectoral asymmetries, the gains from commitment are either zero or negligible. Thus, to the extent that economic fluctuations are
Paez-Farrell, Juan
core

