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Third Degree Price Discrimination and Price Elasticities
SSRN Electronic Journal, 1999According to conventional wisdom, if a monopolist operates in two separate markets whose respective demand functions can be ordered by elasticity, he will charge more on the market with the less elastic demand. In this paper we debunk the widespread canard that this follows from the first order profit maximization conditions.
Thomas D. Jeitschko, Dominique Thon
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Third-Degree Price Discrimination: A Clarification
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008The objective of this paper is to assess how the marginal revenue of a monopoly should be plotted when the market is segmented between consumers with different demands, both in the discriminating and non-discriminating cases. The presentations offered by industrial organization textbooks concerning third-degree price discrimination are not always clear,
Sylvain Weber, Cyril D. Pasche
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Linear Demands and Third-Degree Price Discrimination with Some Caveats
Social Science Research Network, 2020This note shows that compared to uniform pricing, third-degree price discrimination can be neutral. For linear demands, having all price intercepts of submarkets’ inverse demands to be the same is the necessary and sufficient condition for third-degree ...
Yong Chao, Babu Nahata
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A Unified Approach to Second and Third Degree Price Discrimination
ACM Conference on Economics and ComputationIt has long been known that third degree price discrimination --- the practice of charging different prices to consumers in distinct market segments--- may increase or decrease consumer surplus.
Dirk Bergemann, T. Heumann, Michael Wang
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Third-Degree Price Discrimination Revisited
The Journal of Economic Education, 2006Abstract: The author derives the probability that price discrimination improves social welfare, using a simple model of third-degree price discrimination assuming two independent linear demands. The probability that price discrimination raises social welfare increases as the preferences or incomes of consumer groups become more heterogeneous.
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Market Opening under Third-Degree Price Discrimination
The Journal of Industrial Economics, 1994There are frequently regulatory and antitrust pressures for firms to cease price discrimination and practice uniform pricing. Such pressures, however, generally have negative welfare consequences when they lead to weaker markets not being served. This paper derives conditions that determine when price discrimination will induce service to a market ...
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Third-Degree Price Discrimination with Demand Uncertainty
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2004The paper analyzes the price, output and welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination triggered by the portfolio motive of a risk-averse monopolist facing random and potentially correlated market demands. It is shown that contrary to conventional wisdom, price discrimination can occur with identical expected demands, the relatively inelastic ...
Mahmudul Anam, Shin-Hwan Chiang
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The American Economist, 2019
The article points up limitations in the standard undergraduate treatment of third-degree price discrimination by monopolists. While such treatments allude to qualitative distinctions between higher and lower priced alternatives, failure to capture those
C. Adams
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The article points up limitations in the standard undergraduate treatment of third-degree price discrimination by monopolists. While such treatments allude to qualitative distinctions between higher and lower priced alternatives, failure to capture those
C. Adams
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Third-Degree Price Discrimination: Apology Not Necessary
Atlantic Economic Journal, 2010Applied work in price discrimination often treats demand curves among multiple market segments as algebraically additive. Yet the welfare effects of multi-market (third degree) price discrimination depend on how the demand segments are added. Treating demands as geometrically additive yields the well known result that discrimination absent an increase ...
Edward J. Lopez, David J. Molina
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Third-degree price discrimination, quality choice, and welfare
Economics Letters, 2010zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Ikeda, Takeshi, Toshimitsu, Tsuyoshi
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