Long‐Term Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation
ABSTRACT Standard agency theory views would suggest that long‐term investors will use long‐term CEO compensation to align incentives and promote long‐term value maximization. An alternative view is that long‐term investors—who are more able to bear the fixed costs associated with monitoring—will monitor more heavily than short‐term investors, reducing ...
T. Colin Campbell +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Stock Option Incentives and Corporate Hedging Decisions: Theory and Empirical Evidence
ABSTRACT This paper examines how managerial risk‐taking incentives impact corporate hedging decisions. By nesting a well‐known corporate hedging model within a principal‐agent framework, we show that managers are motivated to maintain the same level of hedge intensity even if they are provided with stock option incentives.
Chengcheng Charlie Huang, Yisong S. Tian
wiley +1 more source
Firm‐Level Political Risk and Earnings Manipulation
ABSTRACT Using recently developed proxies for firm‐level political risk and earnings manipulation, we test the limited attention theory. Contrary to Hirshleifer and Teoh's core prediction that investor attention is associated with less managerial manipulation, we find that firm‐level political risk, serving as a proxy for investor attention, is ...
Hui L. James, Thanh Ngo, Jurica Susnjara
wiley +1 more source
Lost in the Noise: How IPO Suspensions Distract Venture Capitalists From Monitoring Portfolio Firms
ABSTRACT We examine how regulatory suspensions of initial public offerings (IPOs) affect venture capitalists’ (VCs’) post‐IPO monitoring of portfolio firms in China. Using a difference‐in‐differences design that exploits three major IPO suspension episodes as quasi‐natural experiments, we provide causal evidence that these shocks divert VCs’ attention ...
Ao Li +3 more
wiley +1 more source
CEO Narcissism and Related Party Transactions
ABSTRACT We examine the association between CEO narcissism and the likelihood of engaging in related party transactions (RPTs) and its influence on the value implications of these transactions. Furthermore, we investigate the effect of board monitoring on the relationship between CEO narcissism and the value effects of RPTs. We find that CEO narcissism
Anwer S. Ahmed +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Unveiling Synergy Gains in Divestitures Using Options Market Information1
ABSTRACT We use stock and options information to decompose and provide a practical measure of the market's beliefs about the different sources of value creation from divestitures. We find that divestitures generate economically significant synergy gains that exceed $1 billion for both acquirers and sellers.
Vinay Patel +2 more
wiley +1 more source
The impact of corporate digital transformation on firms' performance in utilities sector. [PDF]
Wang D, Xia X.
europepmc +1 more source
Worker Heterogeneity and the Effect of Noncompetes on Firm Performance
ABSTRACT Using staggered state‐level changes in noncompete enforceability, we document that reduced enforcement increases profitability, valuation, productivity, and plant‐level growth in knowledge‐worker‐intensive firms relative to other firms. Critically, these gains are concentrated among the most productive knowledge‐worker firms, consistent with ...
Zhaozhao He, Modupe Babajide Wintoki
wiley +1 more source
Central Bank Purchases and Corporate Bond Issuance during the Pandemic: The Case of Japan
Abstract In its massive purchases of corporate bonds during the COVID‐19 pandemic, the Bank of Japan set the maximum eligible remaining maturity at 5 years. I document that during the postpandemic period, Japanese firms increased bond issuance, with the increase concentrated in (1) issuance of bonds with eligible maturities (1–5 years) and (2 ...
Yusuke Tsujimoto
wiley +1 more source
The relationship between heterogeneous institutional investors and operational performance: Evidence from mergers and acquisitions. [PDF]
Park YS, Na J.
europepmc +1 more source

