Results 291 to 300 of about 955,139 (370)
A distributionally robust bilevel optimization model for wholesale-retail electricity market design. [PDF]
Sci RepJia X +7 more
europepmc +1 more source
Protocol for imaging-based quantification of RNAPII clearance during transcription-coupled DNA repair. [PDF]
STAR Protocde Groot BAFJ +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
Too Big to Fail Perception by Depositors: an empirical investigation [PDF]
Lucas A. B. de C. Barros +2 more
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Antitrust and the Financial Sector - with Special Attention to "Too Big to Fail"
, 2014 Lawrence J. White
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Annals of SurgeryObjective: To assess the incidence of posthepatectomy liver failure (PHLF) and the role of the future liver remnant (FLR) in children undergoing major hepatectomy Background: Incidence and risk factors of PHLF in children are unclear, with no validated ...
Juri Fuchs +6 more
semanticscholar +4 more sources
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011 This essay, written for a festschrift volume dedicated to the work of Marilyn Strathern, considers how Strathern's work on relationality, personhood and form illuminates current debates about state-market relations after the financial crisis. Focusing on corporate personhood, in the aftermath of the American occupation of Japan on the one hand, and the
Möschel, Wernhard
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018
Using a synthetic control research design, we find that living will regulation increases a bank’s annual cost of capital by 22 bps, or 10% of total funding costs. This effect is stronger in banks measured as systemically important before the regulation’s announcement. We interpret our findings as a reduction in Too-Big-to-Fail subsidies.
Cetorelli, Nicola, Traina, James
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Using a synthetic control research design, we find that living will regulation increases a bank’s annual cost of capital by 22 bps, or 10% of total funding costs. This effect is stronger in banks measured as systemically important before the regulation’s announcement. We interpret our findings as a reduction in Too-Big-to-Fail subsidies.
Cetorelli, Nicola, Traina, James
openaire +3 more sources
FEDS Notes
Financial institutions that are "Too-Big-to-Fail" impede proper market functioning in financial services. These firms can undermine the disciplining effects of capital markets should their failure have substantial "knock-on" effects on the real economy.
Wayne Passmore, Colleen Faherty
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Financial institutions that are "Too-Big-to-Fail" impede proper market functioning in financial services. These firms can undermine the disciplining effects of capital markets should their failure have substantial "knock-on" effects on the real economy.
Wayne Passmore, Colleen Faherty
openaire +2 more sources