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Two-Sided Matching Problems with Externalities

Journal of Economic Theory, 1996
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Sasaki, Hiroo, Toda, Manabu
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The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets

Econometrica, 1985
This paper considers two-sided markets with general demand structure. A market is two-sided if no buyer wants more than one unit, sellers may offer multiple units, and the good is indivisible. A market is matching if an assignment of buyers and sellers results, in which a monetary payment over the unit involved is possible.
Demange, Gabrielle, Gale, David
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Chapter 16 Two-sided matching

1992
Publisher Summary This chapter discusses the games that are two-sided matching markets. The phrase two-sided refers to the fact that agents in such markets belong, from the outset, to one of two disjoint sets-e.g, firms or workers. The term matching refers to the bilateral nature of exchange in these markets.
Alvin E. Roth, Marilda Sotomayor
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Two-sided matching with diversity concerns

ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 2021
Diversity concerns come up in many important decision making settings including two-sided matching, in particular centralized student admission matching. We overview papers on the topic of two-sided matching with diversity concerns.
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Two-sided matching with interdependent values

Journal of Economic Theory, 2010
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Citanna, Alessandro   +2 more
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Equivalence of two-sided stable matching

Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2018
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Zhong, Liwei, Bai, Yanqin
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On non‐bossy matching rules in two‐sided matching problems

International Journal of Economic Theory, 2013
It is well known that in two‐sided matching problems, stability is incompatible with non‐bossiness. We extensively study whether there exists a non‐bossy matching rule that satisfies certain properties weaker than stability. Results demonstrate that weak stability and respect for recursive unanimity are incompatible with non‐bossiness; however, paired ...
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On heuristics for two-sided matching

Proceedings of the 12th annual conference on Genetic and evolutionary computation, 2010
The stable marriage problem is prototypical of two-sided matching problems, widely encountered in practice, in which agents having preferences, interests and capacities for action of their own are paired up or matched. Standardly, variants of the well-known Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm (GS/DAA) are used to find stable matches.
Steven O. Kimbrough, Ann Kuo
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Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching

Econometrica, 1990
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF TWO SIDED MATCHING have so far concentrated on markets in which certain kinds of market failures were addressed by resorting to centralized, deterministic matching procedures. Loosely speaking, the results of these studies are that those centralized procedures which achieved stable outcomes resolved the market failures, while those
Roth, Alvin E, Vande Vate, John H
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Envious Preferences in Two-sided Matching

2016
We develop a model of two-sided matching problem with individual-sided envious preferences that originate from an emulative envy effect in which a more desirable state that is preferred is owned by the other individual. We assume envious preferences influence an individual’s decision to enter into a two-sided network instead of being unassigned.
Ahamad, Mazbahul, Ahamad, Mazbahul
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