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o Empirismo Construtivo de Bas C. van Fraassen e o Problema do Sucesso Científico

Philósophos: Revista De Filosofia, 2009
O presente trabalho tem por objetivo apresentar os principais aspectos do Empirismo Construtivo de Bas C. van Fraassen, particularmente no que diz respeito ao problema do sucesso científico.
Moraes, Aline, Simon, Samuel
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Van Fraassen's Unappreciated Realism

Philosophy of Science, 2003
What is not often noted about Bas van Fraassen's distinctive approach to the scientific realism issue is that constructive empiricism, as he defines it, seems to involve a distinctively realist stance in regard to large parts of natural science. This apparent defection from the ranks of his more uncompromisingly anti-realist colleagues raises many ...
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VAN FRAASSEN ON THE NATURE OF EMPIRICISM

Metaphilosophy, 2007
Abstract: A traditional view is that to be an empiricist is to hold a particular epistemological belief: something to the effect that knowledge must derive from experience. In his recent book The Empirical Stance, and in a number of other publications, Bas van Fraassen has disagreed, arguing that if empiricism is to be defensible it must instead be ...
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Van Fraassen on Preparation and Measurement

Philosophy of Science, 1996
Van Fraassen’s 1991 modal interpretation of Quantum Mechanics offers accounts of measurement and state preparation. I argue that both accounts overlook a class of interactions I call General Unitary Measurements, or GUMs. Ironically, GUMs are significant for van Fraassen’s account of measurement because they challenge it, and significant for his ...
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Seeing the Unobservable: Van Fraassen and the Limits of Experience

Synthese, 2004
Van Fraassen maintains that the information that we canglean from experience is limited to those entities and processes that are detectable bymeans of our unaided senses. His challenge to the realist, I suggest, is that the attemptto inferentially transcend those limits amounts to a reversion to rationalism.
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Empiricism from Ockham to van Fraassen

2021
This chapter gives a brief overview of the empiricist tradition in philosophy. Although medieval nominalism primarily was motivated by logical and semantic considerations, in retrospect it is fair to view it as an empiricist position and a natural starting point for an overview of empiricism.
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On Accepting Van Fraassen's Image of Science

Philosophy of Science, 1984
In his book, The Scientific Image, van Fraassen lucidly draws an alternative to scientific realism, which he calls “Constructive Empiricism”. In this epistemological theory, the concept of observability plays the pivotal role: acceptable theories may be believed only where what they say solely concerns observables.
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Bas van Fraassen on Religion and Knowledge

American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 2006
In his recent book, The Empirical Stance (2002), Bas van Fraassen elaborates on earlier suggestions of a religious view that has striking parallels with his constructive empiricism. A particularly salient feature consists in the way in which he keeps a critical distance from theoretical formulations both in science and religion, thus preferring a ...
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On Rejecting Foss's Image of Van Fraassen

Philosophy of Science, 1987
Foss's critique of van Fraassen's constructive empiricism is shown to be completely wide of the mark (Foss 1984, van Fraassen 1980). Foss misunderstands van Fraassen's use of the terms ‘observable’, ‘phenomena’, ‘empirical adequacy’, and ‘epistemic community’. He misconstrues constructive empiricism as making knowledge, and perhaps existence, dependent
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Van Fraassen and Ruetsche on Preparation and Measurement

Philosophy of Science, 1999
Ruetsche (1996) has argued that van Fraassen's (1991) Copenhagen Variant of the Modal Interpretation (CVMI) gives unsatisfactory accounts of measurement and of state preparation. I defend the CVMI against Ruetsche's first argument by using decoherence to show that the CVMI does not need to account for the measurement scenario which Ruetsche poses.
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