Results 281 to 290 of about 50,225 (317)
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Self-Enforcing Voluntary Disclosures
Journal of Accounting Research, 1994This paper extends previous accounting research which asks why firms do not voluntarily disclose all value-relevant information, as implied by, for example, Grossman [1981] and Milgrom [1981]. While these two models assume disclosures are costless and verifiable, subsequent papers by Verrecchia [1983], Dye [1985 b], Darrough and Stoughton [1990 ...
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EuroMed Journal of Business, 2016
Purpose– The purpose of this paper is to assess the level of voluntary disclosure in the companies listed on the Italian Stock Exchange. Voluntary disclosure refers to the discretionary release of financial and non-financial information which companies are not obliged to disclose by a standard-setting accounting body. In particular, this paper analyses
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Purpose– The purpose of this paper is to assess the level of voluntary disclosure in the companies listed on the Italian Stock Exchange. Voluntary disclosure refers to the discretionary release of financial and non-financial information which companies are not obliged to disclose by a standard-setting accounting body. In particular, this paper analyses
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Voluntary Disclosure of Clauses
2014We now allow sellers to disclose their hidden clauses at some positive cost. We show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, if naive consumers are few enough a monopolist is more likely to disclose (and therefore to offer efficient friendly clauses) than competitive sellers.
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Shareholder activism and firms' voluntary disclosure of climate change risks
Strategic Management Journal, 2021Caroline Flammer, Michael W Toffel
exaly
Prefazione: Nuova Voluntary Disclosure
2017No abstract ...
Carlo Garbarino, PIAZZA, MARCO
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Voluntary Disclosure of Information [PDF]
This paper considers a "persuasion game", in which a better informed agent (seller) strategically reveals his private information in an attempt to influence a decision maker (buyer). For this class of games, Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) independently showed that in equilibrium the seller fully reveals his private information.
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Board gender diversity, environmental committee and greenhouse gas voluntary disclosures
Business Strategy and the Environment, 2020Ishmael Tingbani +2 more
exaly
Can voluntary environmental regulation promote corporate technological innovation?
Business Strategy and the Environment, 2020Zhenyu Jiang
exaly

