Results 281 to 290 of about 58,551 (312)
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Credibility of Voluntary Disclosure
The RAND Journal of Economics, 2000I examine the credibility of a manager's disclosure of privately observed nonverifiable information to an investor in a repeated cheap-talk game setting. In the single-period game no communication occurs. In the repeated game, however, the manager almost always truthfully reveals his private information provided the manager is sufficiently patient, the
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Voluntary Disclosure in Light of Control Concerns*
Contemporary Accounting Research, 2019ABSTRACTThe centrality of private information in the design of accounting institutions has been explored via agency models that address control concerns as well as disclosure models that amplify valuation issues. This paper derives disclosures by an entrepreneur‐owner when both control and valuation concerns are in play.
Anil Arya, Ram Ramanan
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The Voluntary Disclosure of Innovations
2004Cet article propose une modélisation théorique des comportements de divulgation volontaire des innovations « préliminaires » (résultats d’essais, pistes de recherches, découvertes scientifiques, etc.) observés dans de nombreuses industries. À partir d’un modèle de course technologique à deux étapes, nous définissons les conditions sous lesquelles la ...
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Bargaining with Voluntary Disclosure and Endogenous Matching
Management ScienceWe investigate a bargaining setting between an “informed” player, who has private information, and an “uninformed” player. The informed player has the option to truthfully disclose private information in two unique environments. In the first environment, the informed player is randomly matched with an uninformed player and, after matching, can ...
Andrew M. Davis, Kyle Hyndman
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Voluntary Disclosure of Information [PDF]
, 1993 This paper considers a "persuasion game", in which a better informed agent (seller) strategically reveals his private information in an attempt to influence a decision maker (buyer). For this class of games, Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) independently showed that in equilibrium the seller fully reveals his private information.
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Corporate carbon risk exposure, voluntary disclosure, and financial reporting quality
Business Strategy and the Environment, 2020Tesfaye T Lemma +2 more
exaly
Social capital and firm voluntary disclosure
Advances in Accounting, 2023Yaqin Hu, William M. Cready
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Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2003Li Li Eng, Y T Mak
exaly