Results 71 to 80 of about 5,905 (194)
Educating for Intellectual Virtue: a critique from action guidance [PDF]
Virtue epistemology is among the dominant influences in mainstream epistemology today. An important commitment of one strand of virtue epistemology – responsibilist virtue epistemology (e.g., Montmarquet 1993; Zagzebski 1996; Battaly 2006; Baehr 2011 ...
Carter, J. Adam +2 more
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Negative Epistemic Exemplars [PDF]
In this chapter, we address the roles that exemplars might play in a comprehensive response to epistemic injustice. Fricker defines epistemic injustices as harms people suffer specifically in their capacity as (potential) knowers. We focus on testimonial
Alfano, Mark, Sullivan, Emily
core
Understanding and Coming to Understand [PDF]
Many philosophers take understanding to be a distinctive kind of knowledge that involves grasping dependency relations; moreover, they hold it to be particularly valuable.
Lynch, Michael
core +1 more source
[The version of this paper published by Oxford online in 2019 was not copy-edited and has some sense-obscuring typos. I have posted a corrected (but not the final published) version on this site.
Hinchman, Edward
core
What's the Point of Understanding? [PDF]
What is human understanding and why should we care about it? I propose a method of philosophical investigation called ‘function-first epistemology’ and use this method to investigate the nature and value of understanding-why.
Hannon, Michael
core +1 more source
The Importance of Roles in the Skill Analogy [PDF]
This paper argues for a reinterpretation of the skill analogy in virtue ethics. It argues that the skill analogy should not be understood as proposing that being virtuous is analogous to possessing a practical skill but, rather, as proposing that being ...
Dougherty, Matt
core
Two Varieties of Moral Exemplarism [PDF]
References to moral exemplars run deep into the history of philosophy, as we find them featured in rather disparate context and approaches which span from virtue ethics to moral perfectionism, from existentialism to moral particularism. In the varied and
Marchetti, Sarin
core
First Person and Third Person Reasons and Religious Epistemology [PDF]
In this paper I argue that there are two kinds of epistemic reasons. One kind is irreducibly first personal -- what I call deliberative reasons. The other kind is third personal -- what I call theoretical reasons.
Zagzebski, Linda
core
You Are Only as Good as You Are Behind Closed Doors: The Stability of Virtuous Dispositions [PDF]
Virtues are standardly characterized as stable dispositions. A stable disposition implies that the virtuous actor must be disposed to act well in any domain required of them. For example, a politician is not virtuous if s/he is friendly in debate with an
Goldstein, Rena Beatrice
core
A novel understanding of the nature of epistemic vice. [PDF]
Kotsonis A.
europepmc +1 more source

